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Behavioural finance has been the focal point of discussion and attention in the last three 
decades, thus having a crucial role in explaining the reasons behind irrational investing. As a 
result, it has revealed that all stakeholders, including investors, analysts and managers are prone 
to irrational investment behaviour, regardless of one's experience and the level of education. 
Overconfidence is one of the most prominent factors that can lead investors to make irrational 
decisions in the financial markets, including the Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-
REIT) market. The A-REIT market is one of the most successful REIT markets in the world. 
As publicly quoted companies, A-REITs may be exposed to the implications of corporate 
overconfidence and its influence on the investment decision-making process. This research 
contributes to the behavioural finance literature by investigating the degree of managerial 
overconfidence amongst A-REITs, as well as providing a comprehensive insight into the 
behavioural biases in A-REITs, with an emphasis towards the need to avoid illusions that can 
harm corporate or individual wealth. Whilst a similar study was conducted in the United States 
REIT (US-REIT) market (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015), the scope of the research was confined 
to US-REITs and no other study has reported its effects in any other global REIT markets such 
as the A-REIT market; this being the primary contribution of the research. Using various 
information and secondary data, covering 92 CEOs across 46 A-REITs, the findings showed 
that overconfident CEOs were neither overinvesting in property nor they were selling fewer 
properties than their non-confident counterparts. The results also indicated that CEOs’ 
overconfidence did not have a significant impact on A-REITs’ investments, a finding that 
somewhat contradicts past overconfidence studies. These findings, alongside the Australian 
management literature and ESG scores, suggest that corporate governance may have played a 
major role in mitigating corporate overconfidence.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by introducing Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs), 
behavioural finance, overconfidence and corporate governance. It then reviews the background 
of the study, discusses the limited research conducted, and explores the significance of the 
research. Lastly, the structure of the thesis is provided.  
1.2 Background 
1.2.1  Real Estate Investment Trusts 
A-REITs are among the most successful property investment vehicles in the world, with 46 
REITs and a market capitalization (i.e.: market cap) of US$99.82 billion in 2019 (EPRA, 
2019a). This accounts for 32% of total Asia-Pacific REITs’ market cap and 6% of total global 
REITs’ market cap (EPRA, 2019a). A-REITs were previously known as LPTs (Listed Property 
Trusts) before they were renamed in 2008, as the REIT nomenclature is a more adapted 
terminology globally.  
A-REITs’ growth was slow during the initial establishment period, but it has experienced 
an accelerated growth since their market cap increased significantly since the 1990s (Capozza 
& Seguin, 1999; Lee et al., 2007, 2008; Lee, 2018; Newell & Peng, 2009). The authors 
explained that this growth is caused by a significant increase in investors’ appetite towards A-
REITs, especially amongst institutional investors. Newell and Peng (2009) stated that A-REITs 
became attractive to investors after they had an impressive track-record and a substantial 
increase in their commercial property assets. Furthermore, the Australian property market 
(which includes A-REITs) has an outstanding reputation in transparency as JLL reports, in the 
last decade, have shown that Australia is one of the most transparent markets in the world, with 
the most recent report classifying Australia as the second most transparent market in the world 
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after the United Kingdom (UK) (JLL, 2018) Figure 1 shows the increase in A-REITs’ market 
cap over the period 2000-2018. 
Figure 1: Market Cap of A-REITs: 2000– 2018 
 
Source: Lin, Cho, and Lee (2019) 
 The significance of A-REITs has been increasing in the last four decades and they have 
become one of the most attractive investment vehicles to investors seeking exposure in high-
quality commercial property assets. They have multiple benefits that are of great interest to 
investors; these include their tax-efficient format, the wide variety of sectors they operate in, 
competitive total return performance, relatively low risk and the advantages associated through 
diversification  (Lee, 2018; Newell & Peng, 2009) 
1.2.2 Behavioural Finance and Overconfidence 
Behavioural finance is the study into the influence of psychology on investors’ behaviour 
in the financial market. Its main hypothesis proposes that investors are not always fully rational 
and are affected by their own biases (Shiller, 2003). Behavioural finance offers psychology-
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based theories to interpret and explain the anomalies in the financial market, which stand with 
strong contradiction to the traditional financial theories, especially the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). 
The EMH assumes that share prices reflect all information and that there is no way to 
achieve excess return consistently, either by technical or fundamental analysis. Despite its 
importance in the world of finance, it has been strongly criticized by the emerging field of 
behavioural finance and its proponents. Robert Shiller, a leading proponent of behavioural 
finance, explained that if anomalies in the EMH regarding stock volatility were to remain 
unexplained, then this should call into question its foundations (Shiller, 2003). The author 
stressed that the EMH ignored many market anomalies, such as the day of the week effect, 
January effect and the excess volatility. However, the emerging field of behavioural finance is 
now addressing these anomalies, a matter which made behavioural finance an important 
research topic (Shiller, 2003). 
Behavioural finance studies the reasons behind irrational investing and examines the way 
people behave in the financial market. It takes into consideration that some agents in the 
economy and the financial market, like investors, investment analysts and policymakers, can 
sometimes behave irrationally, or less than fully rational (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). In light 
of this, behavioural finance research revealed that every investor, retail and institutional alike, 
can make irrational decisions. Behavioural finance grew significantly in the last three decades, 
mainly because investors tend not to behave in a manner which is consistent with the traditional 
economics and finance theories, especially the EMH. Traditional finance holds that investors 
are not affected by their emotions and have no confusion concerning how information is 
presented to them.  
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Overconfidence is considered one of the strongest findings in the field of behavioural 
finance as well as in the psychology of judgement (De Bondt & Thaler, 2005). It is one of the 
most important biases and is investigated extensively in behavioural finance studies. It is an 
overestimation of one’s ability, underestimation of risk and exaggeration of the ability to 
control events. Overconfidence is one of the most dangerous behavioural biases in the financial 
market and it can be caused by self-serving bias and illusory superiority (Benos, 1998).  
Psychological factors and emotions, especially overconfidence, can affect people’s investment 
decisions, and may seriously harm their wealth (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Moreover, 
investors’ overconfidence will make them trade more frequently because they tend to 
underestimate the risk of their investments (Hirshleifer & Luo, 2001). 
1.2.3 Corporate Governance 
Since this research is investigating CEOs’ behaviour and A-REITs’ investments, corporate 
governance should be addressed, as the problems of overinvestment and underinvestment could 
also arise because of the conflict of interests between the stakeholders of the company, 
including managers, shareholders and debt holders. This conflict is widely known as the 
principal-agent problem, and this problem itself is part of the bigger topic of corporate 
governance (Cariola et al., 2005; Jensen, 1986). 
Corporate Governance is defined by the ASX Corporate Governance Council as the 
“framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is 
exercised and controlled in corporations” (ASX, 2007). It defines the relationship between key 
stakeholders, management, shareholders and the board of directors. Each country has its own 
corporate governance principles and recommendations that companies must abide with.  These 
principles and recommendations aim to meet the expectations of investors and achieve a good 
governance outcome (ASX, 2007). 
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In Australia, the principles and recommendations are not mandatory because the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council recognizes that every firm may have different culture, size, and 
history, along with other various differentiated factors. However, Australian firms must 
disclose against any recommendation they choose not to follow.  
It is widely recognized that the agency problem, which is caused by the separated ownership 
and control in the company, could be solved by the implementation of strong corporate 
governance. The agency relationship is a contract in which an agent is responsible for 
performing a service on behalf of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Previous studies 
have expressed the importance of the corporate governance role in the investment decision-
making process, and its contribution in mitigating the problems of overinvestment and 
underinvestment (Cariola, La Rocca, & La Rocca, 2005; Jensen, 1986). 
1.3 Limitations of Studies in the A-REIT Market 
A significant number of finance studies have discussed the impact of overconfidence on the 
individual non-corporate investors level such as the study of Sakalaki, Richardson, and 
Bastounis (2005) that pointed out the investment decisions’ essential implications of 
overconfidence, aside from a number of studies that found a significant impact of 
overconfidence on financial market activities (Glaser & Weber, 2007; Odean, 1998; Statman 
& Scheid, 2008) and market participation (Xia, Wang, & Li, 2014). To illustrate, 
overconfidence significantly influences investors’ trading activity and volume, as many studies 
found that overconfidence leads to a significant increase in investors’ trading volume (Barber 
& Odean, 2000, 2002; Gervais & Odean, 2001)  
Be that as it may, overconfidence research which is conducted on the corporate and real 
estate (in particular amongst REITs) level is very limited. The US market is the only place 
where overconfidence researchers conducted their studies – these include the study of 
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Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) that investigated CEO overconfidence and US-REITs’ trading 
activity and performance, the study of Yung, Li, and Sun (2015) that explored the financial 
policies undertaken by US-REITs’ overconfident CEOs, and the study of Tan (2017) that 
examined overconfident CEOs’ capital structure strategy within US-REITs, and their reasons 
behind issuing more debt than equity.  
Overconfidence studies have played a vital role in enhancing the understanding of the 
financial market players’ behaviour. Although a lot of research has been devoted to this area, 
REITs’ markets received just a little attention, especially A-REITs. The property industry is a 
significant part of the Australian economy and a dedicated study of the factors that is affecting 
its investments is critical (Lee, 2008, 2009, 2017; Akimov, 2020). Not only A-REITs’ 
managers should be concerned about their companies’ investments, but also investors and 
financial market participants. Particularly, CEOs and investors’ wealth, to certain extent, 
depend on the performance of A-REITs. Most importantly, A-REITs’ performance and 
investments play a significant role in contributing to the Australian Economy. 
The contribution of the property industry has been significantly increasing in the last few 
years. According to the Property Council of Australia, the property industry made a great 
contribution to the Australian GDP in 2015 (13% or $A202.9 billion) and offers a high number 
of 1.4 million jobs to the Australians, more than mining and manufacturing jobs combined 
(Property Council, n.d.). This contribution has increased as EPRA Total Markets table shows 
that at the time Australian GDP was US$1.4 trillion, the Australian commercial property 
market in 2019 was worth US$612.50 billion, which includes A-REITs’ market cap of 
US$99.82 billion (EPRA, 2019b, 2020). Although many studies have been conducted about 
overconfidence in different industries, securities and countries, more behavioural and financial 
research concentration should be devoted to the A-REIT market because of its role and 
significance to the economy. 
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1.4 Research Aims 
Understanding overconfidence, a very dangerous bias in the financial market, can help 
investors and investment managers avoid emotion-driven speculations that may lead to severe 
financial losses. All investors are vulnerable to behavioural biases, in which investors are 
influenced by emotions that can lead them to make irrational investment decisions (Ritter, 
2003). Many factors play a role in causing and determining overconfidence, both on an 
individual or corporate level. 
This research will provide an in-depth understanding of overconfidence when investing in 
REITs. This will prove useful for local or international investors, analysts, managers and 
shareholders who are interested to know how overconfidence can affect the trading activity and 
performance of financial securities, especially A-REITs. The anticipated goal of the research 
is to make investors and professionals more aware of their investment decision-making process 
by trying to avoid potential self-deception biases. It also aims to encourage investors to research 
more about the companies’ board of directors and their market’s corporate governance 
practices that can greatly impact corporate investment strategies. 
1.5 Methodology 
This is a quantitative study of CEOs’ overconfidence in the A-REIT market. It uses 
secondary data compiled from various sources, which are Refinitiv DataStream, Eikon 
(Thomson Reuters), MorningStar and A-REIT annual reports. A total of 46 A-REITs is 
included in the study, both currently trading companies and delisted ones. EVIEWS were used 
to analyse the collected data. This study reviews past studies’ methods to find a comparable 
method and model.  
This research looks at CEOs’ share trading activity (of their own company’ shares) in the 
financial market and investigates the relationship between CEOs’ own share trading as an 
indicator of their overconfidence and property investments decision-making undertaken during 
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their tenure as CEOs of the A-REIT companies. Further details about the sampling strategy and 
methodology used in this research will be provided in the methodology chapter. 
1.6 Research Questions 
The central question of this research is about the impact of CEOs’ overconfidence, if any, 
on A-REITs’ investments. More specifically, this research aims to examine the following two 
research questions: 
RQ1: What is the impact of CEOs’ overconfidence on the property acquisition activity? 
RQ2: What is the impact of CEOs’ overconfidence on the property disposition activity? 
1.7  Research Significance 
CEOs’ overconfidence has not been investigated in the A-REIT market. Similar studies have 
been conducted in the US-REIT market, where CEO’ overconfidence and US-REITs’ trading 
activity and performance were examined, besides CEOs’ financial policies and capital structure 
strategy (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015; Tan, 2017; Yung, Li, & Sun, 2015). However, CEOs’ 
overconfidence has not been explored in any other country.  
Although many studies have been conducted about irrational investing on the individual 
non-corporate level, just a few have been done on the managerial level. Also, the A-REIT 
market is one of the largest and influential REIT markets in the world, a matter which 
necessitates investigating their property investment activities and how they can be influenced 
by the managerial overconfidence. 
Further, the A-REIT market is very important for its role in the stability of the Australian 
economy, tangible value, source of income and providing job opportunities. As stated before, 
the A-REIT market alone was significant, being 7% (US$99.82 billion) of the Australian GDP 
in 2019 (EPRA, 2019b, 2020).   
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In 2019, the US-REITs’ market cap was US$1.16 trillion (EPRA, 2019b), while the total 
market cap of public companies in the US stock market was around US$ 41.15 trillion (Trading 
Hours, 2020). This sees the size of the US-REIT market being only 3% the size of the total 
stock market. On the other hand, A-REITs’ market cap was US$99.82 billion (EPRA, 2019b), 
while the total market cap of public companies in the Australian stock market was around US$ 
1.14 trillion (Trading Hours, 2020). Comparatively, the size of the A-REIT market is 
approximately 9% the size of the total Australian stock market, therefore having higher 
percentage than the one in the US. 
1.8 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
1) To examine the impact CEOs’ overconfidence on the property acquisition activity of 
A-REITs. 
2) To examine the impact of CEOs’ overconfidence on the property disposition activity of 
A-REITs. 
Table 1 outlines the research questions and objectives: 
Table 1: Questions and Objectives 
Research Questions Objectives 
RQ1: What is the impact of 
CEOs’ overconfidence on the 
property acquisition activity? 
To examine the impact CEOs’ overconfidence on the 
property acquisition activity of A-REITs.  
 
RQ2: What is the impact of 
CEOs’ overconfidence on the 
property disposition activity? 
The aim of this research question is to examine the impact 
of CEOs’ overconfidence on the property disposition 
activity of A-REITs.  
 
Table 1 shows how the two research questions contribute to achieving the main objective 
of this research, which is to assess A-REITs’ managerial overconfidence and find out if 
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CEOs’ overconfidence can result in their companies having an overconfident investment 
behaviour.  
1.9 Research in the A-REIT Market 
Overconfidence has been extensively studied and has rich literature in the business, finance 
and psychology fields. A matter which brings the question: Why research of overconfidence in 
listed real estate companies should be conducted although it has been studied in other stock 
market sectors? There are many differences between the broad stock market and the A-REIT 
market. Thus what can be applied in the stock market does not necessarily apply to investment 
vehicles like REITs (Bao & Li, 2016). 
The impact of corporate governance on REITs’ investments is one important example (Bao 
& Li, 2016). The authors explained that the agency problem is less likely to be present in the 
REIT market. This is consistent with Yung, Li, and Sun (2015) who stressed that the CEOs’ 
behavioural biases can be related to variation in the capital structure, which if consistently 
evaluated, can help mitigate overconfidence and overinvestment problems (Billett & Qian, 
2008; Jensen, 1986).  
Nonetheless, corporate governance research findings in the A-REIT market have differed 
from what is found in the US-REIT market (Newell & Lee, 2012). The authors have found 
contradicting results when comparing corporate governance impact on the Australian and US-
REIT markets. Corporate governance had a substantial impact on A-REITs’ performance while 
no significant relationship was found with US-REITs’ performance (Newell & Lee, 2012). 
Since corporate governance has a vital role in mitigating overconfidence, overinvestment and 
underinvestment (Cariola et al., 2005), more research should be devoted to A-REITs and 
overconfidence under these special settings. 
Market participants in different countries have distinct social and cultural characteristics. 
For this reason, the level of overconfidence may vary from one country to another, hence the 
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same matter for the trading and investment behaviour of investors (Griffin, Nardari, & Stulz, 
2007).  
Taking these matters into consideration, this research aims to fill the gap and address the 
limitations of behavioural studies in the Australian real estate market, by studying the 
overconfidence of corporate and managerial decision-makers of A-REITs. If the findings differ 
from past studies, this provide some explanation to the variation in the overconfidence level.  
1.10 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has introduced behavioural finance, overconfidence, real estate and corporate 
governance, and introduced the gap in the real estate and behavioural finance literature. 
Besides, it expressed the research significance, aims and the need to understand overconfidence 
on the real estate corporate level in Australia.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature of behavioural finance, overconfidence, corporate 
governance, property and REITs in Australia and the world. After that, it proceeds to show 
how the conceptual framework has been developed. 
Chapter 3 presents the data and explains the methodology used to answer the research 
question. It also describes the data sampling strategy, how the data have been collected and 
how they are analysed. 
Chapter 4 discusses the results found after the data analysis and compares them to 
behavioural finance, real estate and corporate governance literature.  
 In chapter 5, a conclusion of the report will be provided, and the limitations will be 
highlighted. This final chapter discusses the research significance of the study and states its 
implications for directions of possible future research.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a review of REIT markets’ literature is provided. It discusses property and 
REITs in the world and Australia. A-REITs’ significance, role in investments, characteristics 
and related matters will be extensively reviewed. Further, a discussion of the behavioural 
finance theory and overconfidence is also provided. 
Besides, a review of overconfidence on the corporate level is presented along with the 
individual level, and the limited literature that combines behavioural finance issues with the 
REIT market is covered. Furthermore, the role of corporate governance is discussed along with 
its effects on corporate investments’ behaviour. 
2.2 Review of Property and Real Estate Investment Trusts 
2.2.1 Real Estate Investment Trusts Establishment and Growth 
In the 1960s, REITs were created by the US Congress. REITs are companies that own, 
operate or finance income-producing properties. Investors can have access to property 
investment through REITs. By 2019, REITs have existed in 37 countries and territories (EPRA, 
2019a). The US-REIT market became one of the most considerable indirect property 
investment vehicles in the world, resulting in a significant rise in its investment over the last 
40 years.  
As of 2019, there are 195 US-REITs with a market cap of USD$1.1 trillion (EPRA, 2019b), 
while only 34 US-REITs (with a market cap of US$1.5 billion) were trading in 1971 (NAREIT, 




Figure 2:Market Cap of US-REITS: 1971-2019 (in US$ Billion) 
 
 Source: Constructed from NAREIT (2020) 
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the US-REIT market was strongly challenged by 
the lack of liquidity in the financial markets and a significant increase in borrowing costs, a 
matter that led to a drop in property investment activities (Marzuki & Newell, 2017). However, 
the post GFC period has witnessed a quick recovery for the US commercial property – these 
include REITs, stocks and direct property. Figure 3 shows the strong rebound of the US 
























































































































Figure 3: Total return index of US major asset classes: 1984-2016 
 
Source: Marzuki and Newell (2017) 
 
2.2.2 Direct Property, Indirect Property and REIT 
The way of investing in property differs among direct and indirect property. Direct property 
investment involves buying residential, commercial and other property assets, or just 
purchasing a stake in them. In doing so, the investor has direct ownership in these types of 
properties. On the other hand, indirect investment in property does not involve the purchase of 
the property itself. An investor can indirectly invest in property by buying shares of listed 
property companies (such as REITs), purchasing shares or ownership percentage of non-listed 
property firms, or investing in exchange-traded funds (ETFs). 
Residential and commercial property are the two basic categories of property, with high 
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Lee, & Liao, 2017), while commercial property is usually dominated by large institutional 
investors (Lin, Lee, & Newell, 2019). However, retail investors have been participating more 
in the commercial property market with the development of new property investment vehicles, 
such as REITs. This allows retail investors some ownership percentage in property without 
necessarily purchasing the whole property, which can be relatively expensive to most 
individuals. This kind of investment makes indirect vehicles more attractive and affordable, 
taking into consideration that such kind of investments does not require an active management 
skill, in contrast to direct investment, which requires a lot of capital and strong management 
skills.  
There are two types of indirect property investments. These investments can be publicly 
traded on a stock exchange or privately held. The major difference between these two kinds of 
vehicles is that the publicly traded one is more liquid because of reachability of investors, 
meaning more trading frequency of its securities, while the privately held ones are usually dealt 
with high net-worth investors and institutions (Clayton & MacKinnon, 2000). Moreover, 
publicly traded securities are usually more informationally efficient (Hardin, Liano, & Huang, 
2005), unlike private property where prices are not reported very frequently. Therefore, listed 
property is regarded as being more transparent and liquid than its private property counterpart.  
REITs are financial securities and investment vehicles that give investors access to property 
assets. They are very beneficial to the investors that want to diversify their portfolio without 
having to contribute to out of reach, expensive and big investments like large-scale commercial 
properties, with the high potential for a consistent income stream. 
Investing in REITs neither requires a huge amount of money for investment nor it costs 
much for the transaction of owning a property. REIT’s main business activity is acquiring, 
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disposing, and managing investment properties which can be in the sectors of offices, 
industrial, or retail. 
A-REITs are attractive to both institutional and individual investors because of their good 
track record and significant assets (Newell & Peng, 2009). The success of A-REITs has also 
attracted considerable research to many of their aspects, especially their performance, risk, and 
diversification. The recovery of A-REITs from the GFC made them continue to play a 
significant role as an investment vehicle in Australia (Lee, 2018; Newell & Peng, 2009).  
The unlisted property trusts have witnessed a huge decline along with the downturn of the 
commercial property market during the GFC. This matter drove investors to seek an investment 
vehicle in property which can offer them a rental income and high liquidity (Lee, 2018). A-
REITs have gained popularity because not only it offered these features, but also diversification 
opportunities and competitive total return performance.  
2.2.3 A-REITs, Transparency and Numerous Features 
A-REITs have attracted the attention of domestic and international investors, and have been 
considered as one of the main asset classes by many superannuation funds in Australia (Newell, 
Lee, & Kupke, 2015a; 2015b). The Australian property market, which includes A-REIT 
companies, has gained higher level of transparency in Australia as the demand increased for 
high-quality information. High transparency has been a key attraction for institutional 
investors, particularly international institutional investors (Zhang, Lee, Chan, 2019). 
The 2018 JLL global real estate index has ranked the Australian property market as the most 
transparent market in the Asia Pacific and the second most transparent market in the world 




Table 2: World’s Most Transparent Property Markets in 2018 







1 United Kingdom 1.24 
2 Australia 1.32 
3 United States 1.37 
4 France 1.44 
5 Canada 1.45 
6 Netherlands 1.51 
7 New Zealand 1.59 
8 Germany 1.88 
9 Ireland 1.93 
10 Sweden 1.93 
11 Finland 1.95 
Source: JLL (2018) 
The major growth of A-REITs occurred in the 1990s, when individual and institutional 
investors were seeking an efficient and effective investment vehicle with rental and liquidity 
focussed format, after unlisted property trusts failed and a downturn of commercial property 
occurred (Stringer, 2001). The investment features of A-REITs appealed institutional investors, 
which increased their popularity as an effective investment vehicle. Besides, many A-REITs 
adopted more aggressive growth strategies since the 1990s like investing in emerging property 
sectors, international property exposure, and increased level of gearing (Newell, 2006).  
Table 3 highlights the market cap, number of REITs and percentage of global REIT index 




Table 3: Top 10 REITs Markets in 2019 
Country Number of REITs Sector Mkt Cap 
($US billion) 
% of Global REIT 
Index 
US 192 1,163.18 64.98% 
Japan 66 128.43 8.23% 
Australia 46 99.82 5.91% 
UK  55 76.24 4.79% 
Singapore 35 61.64 2.26% 
Canada 46 61.16 3.23% 
France 29 57.72 1.77% 
Hong Kong 9 37.45 2.25% 
Netherland 5 26.75 1.83% 
Spain 72 26.74 0.67% 
Source: EPRA (2019b, 2019a) 
Further, the increased level of financial leverage, mergers and acquisitions, and 
incorporating the development of property through stapled securities, has transformed the 
Australian real estate industry (Lee, 2018; Newell, 2006). Figure 4 shows the variation in the 




Figure 4: A-REITs Financial Leverage Ratio: 1995-2016 
 
Source: Wong and Reddy (2018)  
The largest five A-REITs are Goodman Group, Scentre Group, Dexus Property Group, 
Mirvac and Stockland. Table 4 shows these companies’ market cap in 2019: 
Table 4: Market Cap of Top 5 A-REITs in 2019 
A-REITs Market Cap (A$ bn) 
Goodman Group $27.26 
Scentre Group $20.41 
Dexus Property Group $14.23 
Mirvac $12.24 
Stockland $9.94 
Source: Compiled from DataStream 
 
REITs should pay at least a certain percentage of its profits as dividends to their shareholders 




Table 5: Distribution Requirements of REITs 






At least 90% of its 
taxable ordinary 
income 
Not required to distribute Annually 
Australia Typical distribution 
of 100% of trust’s 
income as defined in 
the trust’s 
constitution 
To the extent included 
in the trust’s income, 
any capital gains 
realized on disposal of 
property, including 
interests held in other 
sub-trusts or other 
entities 
Annually or semi-
annually, 90% of tax-
property rental 
profits 100% of PIDs 
from other REITs 
Singapore At least 90% of tax 
transparent income 
Not required -- Annually or 
-- Semi-annually or 
-- Quarterly 
UK 90% of tax-property 
rental profits 100% of 
PIDs from other 
REITs 
Not included in the 
distribution obligation 
Within 12 months of 
the end of the year 
Hong Kong 90% of the audited 
annual net income 
after tax 
Specified in the trust deed Annually 
Spain -- 80% as a general 
rule (i.e. profits 
obtained from rental 
income and ancillary 
activities) 
-- 100% of profits 
stemming from 
dividends distributed 
by qualifying entities 
-- 50% of profits derived 
from the transfer of 
qualifying property and 
holdings where the 
holding period has been 
met 
-- The remaining 50% 
must be reinvested in 
-- In a maximum of six 
months from the 
financial year-end 
-- Dividends must be 
paid to the SOCIMI’s 




Country Operative income Capital gains Operative 
income 
Timing 
qualifying assets in three 
years 
Canada All income of the 
MFT for a taxation 
year is paid or payable 
to unitholders in the 
year so that MFT does 
not incur tax 
All capital gains are paid 
out and retain their 
character as such in the 
hands of unitholders, 
provided a designation is 
made by the MFT 
All income must be 
paid or recognised as a 
payable in the taxation 
year of the MFT. If it is 
payable, then the 
amount can be paid out 
later 
Japan Greater than 90% of 
distributable profits’ 
under the Special 
Taxation Measures 
Law 
Same as ordinary income In relation to the same 
taxable period 
Netherland 100% of taxable profit Capital gains/losses can 
be allocated to a tax-free 
reserve 
Within eight months 
after the end of its 
financial year 
 Source: EPRA (2019a) 
Tax treatment is not the same in all REITs’ markets. In Australia, while there is no rule for 
minimum distributions to unitholders for tax transparency eligibility, in most cases, A-REITs 
distribute almost all of their taxable income as dividends on an annual or semi-annual basis 




Table 6: Tax Treatment in the A-REIT Market 
Current Income Capital Gains Withholding 
Tax 
Not taxable in the hands of the 
trustee provided the unitholders 
are presently entitled to the trust’s 
income at the end of the income 
year, otherwise trustee taxed at the 
highest marginal rate. 
-Tax treatment of capital gains similar 
to that of ordinary income. 
-50% CGT discount may be 
available for Australian resident unit 
holder; however, the 50% discount 
will not apply to non-resident 
unitholders on capital gains accrued 
after May 08, 2012. 
N/A 
Source: EPRA (2019a) 
2.2.4 Performance of A-REITs 
Lee (2018) investigated the performance of A-REITs against other financial securities and 
found that A-REITs outperformed the bond market, shares market, and direct property in 
Australia over one year period from December 2015 to September 2016, as the annualized 
return of A-REITs was higher than the other securities. 
Although the return was even higher over a three-year performance measure (18.2% per 
annum), A-REITs underperformed the share market and direct property market over the 10-
year and 15-year period because of the GFC (Lee, 2018). However, it was clear that there were 
improved returns after the crisis period, which shows a strong recovery and continuation to 
lead the property market in the world. This is collaborated with their transparency rating (JLL, 
2018), contribution to the economy and GDP (EPRA, 2019b) and market cap growth.  
A-REITs were impacted by the GFC in 2008, as the major loss of the defensive 
characteristics of the traditional “low risk” of A-REITs happened as a response to its increased 
volatility (Lee & Lee, 2012). Besides, the aggressive growth strategies that were taken during 
that time such as international property exposure and high debt levels were argued to have a 
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negative impact on the performance of A-REITs (Lee, 2018). However, important changes 
have been implemented by A-REITs in the post-crisis period by recapitalizing and focusing 
more on Australian prime commercial properties while reducing the levels of debt, as the high 
levels of debt were a very important factor in impacting A-REITs performance (Newell & 
Peng, 2009). This has made A-REITs recover from the GFC and enhance their returns (Lee, 
2018). 
2.2.5 Diversification: Correlation with Financial Securities 
The correlation between financial securities and US-REITs has been found to be dynamic. 
Over the short-run, the diversification potentials of REITs appeared to be time-dependent 
(Brueggeman & Fisher, 2011). A correlation coefficient of 0.69 between equity REITs and 
shares and 0.41 between bonds and REITs have been found by the authors for the period 1978-
92. The authors also found that there is a decline in the correlation coefficients between US-
REITs and common stocks, which was also reported (Ghosh, Miles, & Sirmans, 1996; Lin, 
Lee, & Newell, 2019) throughout of 1985-96; the authors found that the monthly correlation 
coefficient to decline from 0.77 for 1985-7 to 0.38 for 1991-3. Such declines have also been 
reported by Clayton and Mackinnon (2001), Conover, Friday, and Sirmans (2002) and 
Westerheide (2006). These declines have been caused by the increasing level of information 
about REITs due to an increase in the number of analysts following the real estate industry 
(Khoo, Hartzell, & Hoesli, 1993). However, correlation coefficients’ increase has been 
reported by some studies, specifically from 1999 to December 2005 (Case, Yang, & Yildirim, 
2012). This increase was due to the inclusion of REIT in indices like the S&P 500 from the 
beginning of October 2001 (Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2006). 
Dynamic correlation between stock returns and REITs has been confirmed over 1972-2008 
(Case et al., 2012). Correlations were explained by different microeconomic variables such as 
inflation, unemployment rate and credit spreads (Fei, Ding, & Deng, 2010).  
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Marzuki & Newell (2017) recently studied the correlation between US property, REITs and 
other asset classes over the period 1994-2016. Table.7 shows these correlations. 
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Table 7: Correlation between US Property and Other Asset Classes over the period 1994-2016 
 significant correlation (P < 5%) 
Source: Marzuki and Newell (2017)
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
REITs [1] 1.00            
Office [2] 0.95* 1.00           
Retail [3] 0.96* 0.86* 1.00          
Industrial [4] 0.90* 0.87* 0.89* 1.00         
Apartment [5] 0.91* 0.88* 0.85* 0.79* 1.00        
Direct property [6] 0.48* 0.44* 0.49* 0.50* 0.49* 1.00       
Office [7] 0.48* 0.48* 0.48* 0.50* 0.49* 0.92* 1.00      
Retail [8] 0.24* 0.18* 0.25* 0.28* 0.23* 0.73* 0.51* 1.00     
Industrial [9] 0.43* 0.41* 0.42* 0.43* 0.45* 0.88* 0.77* 0.52* 1.00    
Apartment [10] 0.48* 0.45* 0.52* 0.51* 0.52* 0.89* 0.80* 0.49* 0.81* 1.00   
Stocks [11] 0.56* 0.59* 0.50* 0.58* 0.46* 0.35* 0.35* 0.23* 0.33* 0.28* 1.00  
Bonds [12] 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.08 0.06 1.00 
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In Australia, the correlation of A-REITs was found to be negative (r=-0.14) with bonds, 
positive (r=0.65) with shares and weak (r=0.35) with direct property (Lee, 2018). This is a 
further indication that A-REITs play a vital role in diversification for Australian and 
international investors. However, a recent study conducted by Lin, Cho, and Lee (2019) has 
shown that there is a difference between the sector-specific A-REITs and diversified A-REITs, 
in terms of their role in a mixed-asset portfolio. The authors’ investigation period is 2000-2019 
and they found that the sector-specific A-REITs had a more strategic and value-added role than 
diversified A-REITs in a portfolio. This is because sector-specific A-REITs have increased 
portfolio returns, superior risk-adjust returns, and enhanced diversification benefits compared 
to diversified A-REITs. Figure 5 shows that the market cap growth of sector-specific A-REITs 
is much greater than the diversified A-REITs.   
Figure 5: Market Cap Growth of Diversified and Sector-Specific A-REITs 
 
Source: Lin et al. (2019) 
Further, a study conducted in Japan has shown that Japanese Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(J-REITs) also offers many diversification benefits to the investors, which make them having 
a major role in contributing to a mixed-asset portfolio (Lin, Lee & Newell, 2019). The authors 
have found that residential J-REITs have a positive correlation with stocks (r=0.60), while 
having a negative correlation with bonds (r=-0.08). However, it is worth noting that the 
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negative correlation with bonds were found to be insignificant (Lin et al., 2019). The authors 
studied these correlations over the period 2006-2018. However, different subsectors of J-REITs 
had different correlations with stocks. The following table shows the correlation between J-
REITs’ subsectors and stocks.  
Table 8: Correlation of J-REITs Subsectors with Stocks 
Sub-sectors of J-REITs Correlation with Stocks 
Industrial J-REITs r= 0.41 
Retail J-REITs r=0.52 
Specialty J-REITs r=0.54 
Office J-REITs r=0.55 
Residential J-REITs 0.60 
Source: Lin et al. (2019)  
Table 8 shows that residential J-REITs underperformed all office, industrial, retail and 
specialty J-REITS. Besides, the following table shows the correlation between J-REITs’ 
subsectors and bonds. 
Table 9: Correlation between J-REITs Subsectors and Bonds 
Subsectors of J-REITs Correlation with Bonds 
Industrial J-REITs r= -0.04 
Retail J-REITs r= -0.06 
Specialty J-REITs r= -0.10 
Office J-REITs r= -0.06 
Residential J-REITs r= -0.08 
Diversified r= -0.09 
Source: Lin et al. (2019) 
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Lin, Lee, and Newell (2020) studied the average annual return between REITs (industrial 
and logistics REITs) and the other sub-sectors of REITs. The authors also compared the REITs’ 
average annual return to stocks and bonds. The comparison was in four countries, which are 
Japan, Australia, Singapore and the US. It is found that the industrial and logistics REITs had 
a superior average annual return over other sub-sectors of REITs, stocks and bonds (Lin et al., 
2020). This shows that the industrial and logistics REITs greatly contributes to a mixed-asset 
portfolio, as they offer significant diversification benefits. The diversification benefits are also 
corroborated with the correlation findings of Lin et al. (2020) across the 4 countries. Table 10 
shows these correlations.  
Table 10: Correlations Across 4 countries 
 




2.2.6 REIT, Economy and Volatility of the Markets 
As stressed in Chapter 1, A-REITs contribution to the GDP is vital. The A-REIT market is 
very important due to its role in the stability of the Australian economy, as this market alone 
was a significant 7% (US$99.82 billion) component of the Australian GDP in 2019 (EPRA, 
2019b, 2020). 
Lee, Stevenson and Lee (2018) identified strong linkages between the low-frequency 
volatilities of top 11 REITs’ markets in the world and the macroeconomic series. The 
macroeconomic variables tested in the authors’ study are GDP, short term interest rates, 
exchange rates, M2 money supply and consumer price index (CPI). They found out that the 
impact of macroeconomic variables is clearly shown when computing quarterly volatility from 
the low-frequency component. Also, they discovered that property stocks’ reaction to macro-
economic risk is different from the reaction of other stock market sectors. 
Lee (2009) studied the volatility of the A-REIT market. The author found that A-REITs’ 
stocks strongly affect A-REITs’ futures, which indicates that any news from the A-REITs’ spot 
market will have a strong influence on A-REITs’ futures (Lee, 2009). To illustrate, there are 
two markets for A-REITs, which are the cash market and the futures market. The cash market, 
also called spot market, is where financial instruments are traded and delivered immediately, 
whereas the exchange of an underlying asset happens at a future date in the futures market. 
Most importantly, A-REITs’ investors should watch closely both spot and futures A-REITs’ 
markets as news generated from the spot market will have a great impact on the volatility of 
the futures market, and vice versa (Lee, 2009). The authors also discovered a difference in the 
sensitivity of REIT futures towards news, in which REITs are more sensitive to negative news 
than positive ones. 
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 Lee, Kuo, Lee, and Lee (2016) also examined the price discovery and volatility 
transmission between the cash market and futures market of A-REITs. They found that in the 
context of information transmission processes and price discovery, the cash market dominated 
the futures one prior to the GFC, which contradicted previous stock index studies which state 
that futures markets leads cash markets (Chan, Lin, & Hsu, 2004). This means that the 
information flowed to the A-REITs’ cash market more than it did to the A-REITs’ futures 
market. However, the information flow has changed during the GFC, as information flowed 
bilaterally into both markets. After the GFC, the A-REITs’ futures market followed the A-
REITs’ spot market but less closely (Lee et al., 2016). The authors explained that this is due to 
the significant increase in A-REITs’ futures market activity, when many informed spectators 
entered the market and improved its price discovery. 
2.2.7 Risk and Return of A-REIT 
The relationship between the risk and return of A-REITs has been investigated before to 
examine the importance of downside beta when explaining A-REITs’ returns (Lee, Robinson, 
& Reed, 2008a). The authors strongly criticized the CAPM, explaining that the CAPM is bound 
by strict assumptions. One of these assumptions is that the return distributions should be 
normally distributed, while REIT’s distributions are skewed with large tails more often than 
not (Myer & Webb, 1993; Young & Graff, 1995). Another assumption is that investors do not 
like or do not prefer both downside and upside volatilities, which is not true as deviations above 
the mean must be viewed and accounted as gains (Lee et al., 2008b). 
It is found that investors do not ask for more compensation if assets have upside potential, 
but only ask for a premium for assets that have downside risk (Lee et al., 2008). So, the authors’ 
study, on all A-REITs for the period 1993-2005, confirmed that downside beta outperforms 
traditional beta in explaining variations in A-REITs’ returns. This is consistent with past studies 
which confirmed that return distributions significantly impact the relationship between beta 
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and downside beta, hence explaining the reasons behind downside beta’s better performance 
than traditional beta (Galagedera, 2007; Nantell & Price, 1982). 
Lee, Reed and Robinson (2007) assessed A-REITs’ momentum strategies and their 
profitability for the period 1990-2005. The authors found that the momentum trading strategy 
in A-REITs is profitable. Different time horizons were examined if similar patterns in 
momentum returns were generated, and the analysis has confirmed that all the patterns were 
similar. Hence, the long strategy has generated huge momentum returns, and it is worth noting 
that the returns of A-REITs were higher the returns of U.S REITs (Lee et al, 2007).  This 
implies that A-REITs’ investors can generate abnormal returns if they adapt a momentum 
trading strategy, especially a long strategy (Lee et al., 2007). 
Momentum returns were also studied in different markets states (Hung & Glascock, 2008). 
The authors found that momentum returns are higher in a favourable market conditions, and 
that the dividend/price ratio of the winners is higher than the losers. Further, it was found that 
there is a positive correlation between momentum return and the dividend/price ratio’s 
difference between winners and losers (Hung & Glascock, 2008). Besides, winners had higher 
returns, which are probably caused by the higher dividend/price ratios (Hung & Glascock, 
2008). Further, the authors found that there has been a significant growth in REITs’ 
dividend/price after the structural change (new REIT era). In addition, Lee et al. (2014) also 
found the calendar seasonality evidence that supports the notion of behavioural biases are 
stronger when assets are more difficult to value. 
2.2.8 A-REIT and Risk Sensitivity 
As discussed in the previous section, downside beta has helped explain the variations in 
returns of A-REITs better than the traditional beta. However, to better understand these 
variations, the relationship between risk sensitivity and A-REITs should be addressed. For this 
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purpose, Lee et al. (2008) have examined the systematic downside risk’s determinants in the 
A-REIT market. The authors also investigated the relation of the variations in the market risk 
and downside systematic risk with the financial conditions and management structure of A-
REITs. Since earlier studies have only investigated the relationship between systematic risk 
and financial determinants (Allen, Madura, & Springer, 2000; Conover & Friday, 1998), Lee 
et al. (2008) focused more on the relationship between downside systematic risk and financial 
determinants, and found that they can be individually identified and there is a strong link 
between downside risk, management structure and financial determinants, especially financial 
leverage. In contrast to downside systematic risk, only a little evidence supported the 
relationship between systematic risk and A-REITs’ financial determinants and management 
structure (Lee et al., 2008). Lee (2009) also found that downside beta provide a positive 
premium, an intuitively appealing return-risk relation, is required by direct property investors 
for compensating higher downside losses. 
2.2.9 Corporate Social Responsibility, A-REIT and REIT Investments and Performance 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a business model, which is self-regulated in 
companies, that helps corporations to be socially responsible and accountable to the public, 
shareholders and stakeholders. Practising CSR can lead companies to take serious 
considerations, when operating their business, towards the environment and the economy, 
which results in a positive contribution to society (Garriga & Melé, 2004). This is not only 
beneficial to the society, but also valuable for the firm as such good actions being taken can 
boost morale and strengthen the bond between employees and their companies (Garriga & 
Melé, 2004). 
CSR has been acknowledged by business studies and literature as a vital duty. Arlow & 
Cannon (1982) stated that is very important to study the relationship between CSR and the 
decision-making process in the companies, as well as their financial performance. Much of 
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business research has been devoted to this area which opened arguments about the real 
relationship between companies’ responsibilities and performance - is it really beneficial to the 
company to be socially responsible while others are making more money when not following 
the CSR model? While some argued it may or may not be the case (Ullmann, 1985), others 
insisted that the costs of being socially responsible are minimal and may be of great benefit to 
the firms as their productivity will be better as well as their relationship and bond with their 
employees (Moskowitz, 1972; Parket & Eilbirt, 1975).  
In Australia, CSR has been gaining significance and importance in the market, as Australian 
companies, A-REITs and property investors are prioritising corporate governance, 
environmental and social issues when making investment decisions (Newell & Lee, 2012). The 
relationship between the CSR factors and A-REITs’ financial performance has been 
particularly assessed by Newel and Lee (2012), to check if such factors are adding value to 
property listed companies. They have studied the role of some financial factors such as book-
to-market value, size, gearing and beta, along with CSR factors. They found that the financial 
factors are more influential than the CSR dimensions of environment, social and corporate 
governance. However, considering CSR factors alone, they have found that corporate 
governance to be more influential on the pricing of A-REITs than the social and environmental 
factors. Such findings imply that further research should be devoted to this matter on the 
REITs’ international market level.   
A-REITs are renowned to have strong commitment and leadership in CSR (Newell, 2008; 
Newell & Lee, 2012), as they articulate substantial CSR strategies and performance in the CSR 
reports they produce, both at an individual and portfolio level. They have been found to have 
a very efficient usage of energy and water, which made them classified as highly rated green-




Table 11: A-REITs’ CSR Strategies 
A-REIT CSR Strategies CSR Targets/Initiatives 
Stockland Stockland’s CSR strategy is designed 
around creating value and aims to 
“deliver economic value in a way that 
also creates value for society by 
addressing its needs and challenges” 
and by attempting to balance the triple 
bottom line for its current and future 
stakeholders (Stockland 2017, para. 3).” 
(i) Providing affordable housing options 
for first home buyers 
(ii) To continue towards their 2025 target 
of a 60 per cent reduction in carbon 
emissions. (iii) The development of an 
Environmental Management System to 
identify environmental risks and 
opportunities, along with the appointment 
of an external auditor to conduct a Fraud 





Dexus’ CSR strategy is to invest 
“responsibly to deliver sustained value 
to stakeholders” by embracing 
resilience, liveability and connectivity 
(Dexus 2017, para. 1). Dexus’ 
sustainability approach is designed 
around key objectives and incorporates 
the management of ESG issues across 
their portfolio. 
(i) Philanthropic activities such as the 
opportunity for employees to take a one 
day paid volunteering leave and the 
appointment of 23 Community Managers 
to facilitate community engagement. 
(ii) To provide 1,000,000 square metres 
(sqm) of office real estate with at least a 5-
Star NABERS Energy rating and 4-Star 
NABERS Water rating by 2020. 
(iii) The reduction of energy consumption 
by 10 per cent by 2020. 
GPT 
Group 
GPT’s CSR strategy embraces the 
concept of sustainability and recognizes 
the needs of both current and future 
generations. Group (2017, para 9), 
asserts that while generating economic 
value, they must also consider their 
ESG impact, and that “[t]he voice of 
stakeholder communities and the needs 
of today’s and future generations are at 
the heart of our decision making. 
(i) The development of a biodiversity 
measurement tool, which produces 
practical measures for on-site biodiversity. 
(ii) To achieve a weighted average 
NABERS Energy rating of at least 4.5 
stars. (iii) The reduction of energy intensity 
by 40 per cent and emissions intensity by 
57 per cent, and an increase in recycling 
rates from 29 per cent to 41 per cent since 
2005. 
Source:  Westermann, Niblock and Kortt (2019) 
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When comparing the REITs’ markets between the US and Australia, Newell and Lee (2012) 
found that despite both markets’ requirement to pay most of its net earnings, corporate 
governance has a significant impact on A-REITs performance while no significant relationship 
with the performance of US-REITs, although the case is different for other US sectors (Bauer, 
Eichholtz, & Kok, 2010; Hartzell, Sun, & Titman, 2006; Khoo, Hartzell, & Hoesli, 1993). 
Newell and Lee (2012) explained that finding corporate governance significantly impacting A-
REITs, while having no effects on US-REITs, reflects the GFC’s impact on A-REITs and the 
ASX’s high disclosure requirements. Nonetheless, the significance of corporate governance on 
the performance of A-REITs is consistent with the governance relationship that Bauer et al., 
(2010) found with the other US sectors. 
Billett and Qian (2008) emphasized that overconfidence has serious implications for 
corporate governance. The authors stressed that if CEO overconfidence is detected, the source 
of overconfidence should be investigated, in order to take the proper actions that can stop the 
development of this bias. Such actions can be related to, for example, CEOs’ incentives (Billett 
& Qian, 2008). 
2.2.10 Risk and Real Estate Investors’ Behaviour  
Many studies examined the systematic risk and its role in investors’ decision-making 
process. However, it has only been studied in the property industry from the late 1990s onward, 
starting with the studies that examined the downside risk and its implications when building a 
property investment portfolio (Foo & Eng, 2000; Sivitanides, 1998), along with studies that 
have been conducted in the Australian context (Allen et al., 2000; Lee, et al., 2008a,b; Lee et 
al., 2008).  
Portfolio management studies confirmed that there is a gap between risk-related theories 
and practices (Louargand, 1992; Eliane Worzala, Sirmans, & Zeitz, 2000). In other words, 
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financial analysts or portfolio managers do not always follow the theory, which indicates the 
presence of a conflict between theory and practice (Lee, Reed, & Robinson, 2008a). Further, 
some studies found surprising results after examining property investors perception towards 
risk (Evans, 2008; Worzala, Sirmans, & Zeitz 2008). The authors’ findings contradicted the 
renowned direct relationship between risk and return, as they discovered that property investors 
are not risk-tolerant towards higher returns, because they did not believe that higher risk can 
be justified by higher returns. However, these results are not applicable for all finance 
professionals and investors, as Asian and European investors recognized the vital role real 
estate plays in portfolio diversification. This has been found from the analysis of two surveys 
sent to investors in Asia and Europe (Newell & Worzala, 1995; Worzala & Newell, 1997). 
In addition, Lee et al. (2008) conducted a qualitative study about downside risk and 
investors’ behaviour, by examining the perceptions of property fund managers (of both listed 
and unlisted companies) and investors towards downside risk. The authors sent a questionnaire 
to the Australian property fund managers to obtain their opinions. It is found that although risk 
management is relevant and seriously considered by these fund managers, they do not have any 
specific risk measure (Lee et al., 2008). However, they do manage and minimize their risk my 
measures such as stress analysis, scenario analysis, value at risk (VAR) and standard deviation. 




Figure 6:Risk Measures Used by Property Fund managers 
 
Source: Lee et al. (2008) 
The surveys’ analysis of Lee et al. (2008) indicated that only downside risk is considered 
by property managers and investors, as their responses implied that they do not worry if their 
companies exceed the expected performance rate, a matter which is predictable and consistent 
with previous studies. However, this study has further implications about managers and 
investors behaviour and perception towards downside risk. Although property fund managers 
acknowledge downside risk’s impact on their investments, they do not accept any analytical 
and empirical analysis that theoretically confirms downside risk, as they only consider the 
economic meaning of this risk (Lee et al., 2008). 
2.3 Review of Behavioural Finance 
The academic discussion began to shift away from concentrating on dividends, earnings, 
time series and prices towards analysing psychological factors role in the stock market (Shiller, 
2003). During the 1990s, a revolution was occurring in psychology and, at the same time, 
behavioural finance was progressing along with it; it brought forth the idea that emotions have 
a big role in the investment decision-making process (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
The new field of behavioural finance has first emerged in the 1990s and attracted the 
attention of many scholars, newspapers, academic journals and business publications (Ricciardi 
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& Simon, 2000). The main aim of behavioural finance is to explain the reasons behind 
investment choices, which involves emotional processes that affect the decision-making 
process. It is described by Ricciardi and Simon (2000) as a way to “explain the what, why, and 
how of finance and investing, from a human perspective”. 
Academic finance has developed remarkably. The evolution has started from the Efficient 
Market Theory, that assumes that it is impossible to beat the market consistently on a risk-
adjusted basis (Eugene, 1998; Fama & Malkiel, 1970; Ricciardi & Simon, 2000; Shiller, 2003). 
Behavioural finance, which stands in a strong contradiction to the EMH, has incredibly grown 
and explored the phycological biases and their impact on investors’ financial decisions. Most 
importantly, behavioural finance has helped investors to make better investment decisions 
(Hirshleifer, 2015). The author stated that behavioural finance has achieved helping investors 
by focusing on their cognitive biases on the individual level.  
Figure 7: From Traditional Finance to Behavioural Finance 
 
Source: Pimenta and Fama (2014) 
The emerging field of behavioural finance has challenged the EMH, which assumes that the 
prices of financial securities reflect genuine information, and that stock markets are efficient 
and work well all the time (Shiller, 2003). The author stated that behavioural finance 
approaches finance from a broader perspective than traditional finance, where behavioural 
finance incorporates some other fields like sociology and psychology. Furthermore, the 
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literature is rich with behavioural finance studies which describe the emerging field as the 
“psychology of finance”, and researchers are still attempting to find a proper balance of many 
disciplines; Behavioural finance, standard finance, sociology and psychology. The integration 
of many different disciplines and schools is what makes behavioural finance a unique field 
(Ricciardi & Simon, 2000). 
2.3.1 Behavioural Finance, Moods and Emotions 
Behavioural finance proponents, researchers and analysts focused on the role of emotions 
and moods in shaping the financial and investment behaviour of investors (Duxbury, 2015). 
Different moods and emotions have different effects on investors’ behaviour and their decision-
making process in various and special scenarios. For example, an investor that is in a good 
mood tends to be more optimistic and risk-taking (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2011). On the other 
hand, when investors are in fear they begin to be risk-averse and pessimistic (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001). Surprisingly, anger can make investors more risk-tolerant and optimistic according to 
psychology studies (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  






Behavioural finance proponents have identified major behavioural traits that may have a 










can have are overconfidence, herding, prospect theory, heuristics, and misperceiving 
randomness (Ritter, 2003) 
Heuristics are a method the brain uses to solve problems in a simple way, utilising shortcuts 
in a very short or limited time. Such flexibility may be needed to produce solutions that are 
considered good enough to solve a complicated problem with complex data. In a fast-paced 
business, such a process is being significantly prevalent. According to Malmendier, Tate, and 
Yan (2011), investors’ experience can have significant effects on the decisions they make, and 
subsequently making them heuristic after influencing their investment analysis strategy. 
Investors can even unconsciously develop certain investing habits which can lead them to make 
mistakes (Hirshleifer, 2015). Although being heuristics can be beneficial in many life aspects, 
using them in the financial markets can have serious consequences. 
Consensus heuristic, in which an investor may believe that if the majority of investors have 
a certain opinion, then this opinion is definitely right. This has been proven in behavioural 
finance and psychology studies (Andersson, Hedesström, & Gärling, 2014). Therefore, such a 
belief can lead investors to become herd. As stated in the previous chapter, behavioural finance 
has shown that even finance professionals can make irrational investment decisions, and 
therefore be heuristics, which is consistent with Hirshleifer (2015), who stressed that even 
finance professionals can be using heuristics. However, Hirshleifer (2015) stated that everyone 
can make better and more accurate investment decisions if they become aware of their 
heuristics.  
Prospect theory is one of the most important theories in the behavioural finance discipline. 
It argues that investors prefer guaranteed profit, even if they have a chance of getting more 
profit with more risk. It stands in contradiction to the EMH, as this traditional hypothesis 
suggests that investors are indifferent in the way they reach the final state of wealth from which 
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they receive their utility (Duxbury, 2015). On the other hand, prospect theory insists that it is 
important to know how investors reached the final state of wealth even if the final point is the 
same (Jordan, Miller, & Dolvin, 2015). Furthermore, the authors state that investors’ main 
concern is the change in their wealth not the levels of wealth. Such a suggestion can be 
supported by many biases like mental accounting, loss aversion and anchoring. 
Thaler (1999) defines mental accounting as “the set of cognitive operations used by 
individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities”. 
Investors tend to follow an irrational way when dealing with their money, as they separate it 
into different mental buckets, then treating the buckets’ risk tolerance and values in a different 
way (Jordan et al., 2015). So, falling in the trap of mental accounting will lead investors to 
behave irrationally, as they will have an incomprehensive view of the assets they own and the 
outcomes they anticipate and desire. For example, people may save and keep some money 
aside for future use and plans such as a vacation, purchase of property or cars, while at the 
same time having some liabilities like a debt to a friend and a bank, or a debt resulting from 
credit cards usage. People then think that separating both issues is something that makes sense 
while in fact, it doesn’t make sense at all, since the interest charges that may arise as a result 
of the way that the debt is being repaid may reduce their fortunes and net worth. The same 
thing can happen in corporations when decision-makers are allocating funds. 
Loss aversion, which is described by Thaler (1999) as myopic, refers to investors who are 
trying to avoid losses in an investment, even if they can gain from it. Investors then will be 
focusing to avoid potential losses than focusing on making a profit. This problem will become 
greater if someone experiences more and more losses. Previous research has shown that people 
experience a stronger feeling of pain when losing than they enjoy gaining. As stated, loss 
aversion is myopic according to Thaler (1999) because although investors that are investing on 
the long term have similar horizons, they do care about the gains and losses in the short term.  
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Anchoring, a dangerous behavioural bias, is prolific in the financial market. It occurs when 
investors set up a particular reference point for their investments (Jordan et al., 2015). Once 
they set up this reference point (usually the purchasing price of a stock or any other asset), they 
will start to have feelings that change according to the price movement. If the price moves as 
they desire, they will feel rewarded, otherwise they will feel punished (Duxbury, 2015). 
However, this is not the main problem. The problem is that investors start caring too much 
about this reference point, a matter which makes them ignore or forget about their level of 
wealth. As a result, investors will not adjust their analysis or anchor properly, a matter that will 
make them stay in the investment irrationally (Sinha, 2015). This is usually associated with 
keeping, for example, a stock for too long and refusing to take the profit, as investors believe 
this stock will keep on moving as desired and generate a greater profit. However, investors 
should take a closer look at their portfolios and evaluate their stocks or investments based on 
its covariance with the overall portfolio, rather than just evaluating stock return according to 
its purchasing price.  
2.3.2 Bubbles and Investors’ Behaviour  
A lot of bubbles have occurred both recently and a long time ago. Those bubbles have 
strongly shaken the market and led to financial crises. The most recent one is the GFC, which 
was caused by irrational expectations of investors, after they kept on buying more houses 
following their gains between 2000 and 2006, a matter that led to the 2008 crisis. Clayton 
(1997) stated that housing booms are caused by investors’ behaviour, where they tend to ignore 
or neglect fundamentals and have too many illogical expectations.  
When Shiller (2003) was discussing the shift from EMH to behavioural finance, he talked 
about the Tulipmania bubble that happened in the 1630s. This bubble happened after the tulip 
became very popular and many people kept on buying this flower. As a result, the tulip price 
increased, and a lot of people became rich. Wise people began to see that what is happening 
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will not last forever. Rich people stopped purchasing these tulips for putting it in their gardens 
and started selling them. After that, the bubble burst, the price dropped and never rose again. 
Shiller (2003) compared such phenomena to the feedback theory, where investors get 
successful because of price surge, which attracts market attention. Further, numerous studies 
have been done on housing price bubbles and market fundamentals (Al-Masum & Lee, 2019; 
Bangura & Lee, 2019; Phillips, Shi, & Yu, 2015; Shi, Chen, & Wang, 2016; Stevenson, 2008). 
Lee, Stevenson, and Lee (2014) and Lee et al. (2016) also found that market efficiency is 
strongly affected by investors behaviours. These suggest that it is essential to understand 
investors’ behaviour for a variety of investment decision making processes.  
2.3.3 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is one of the most important cognitive biases that may lead investors to take 
wrong investment decisions (Ritter, 2003). Ritter stated that investors tend to invest more in 
the company they work for.  
Overconfidence, as defined by Ackert and Deaves (2009) is “the tendency for people to 
overestimate their knowledge, abilities, and the precision of their information, or to be overly 
sanguine of the future and their ability to control it”. So, it is clear that overconfidence has 
many sides or characteristics such as illusion of control, miscalibration and better-than-average 
effect. Moreover, optimism is often used interchangeably with overconfidence in the 
behavioural finance literature.  
Illusion of control is one of the most obvious forms of overconfidence. Overconfident 
investors usually overestimate their ability and think that every event or potential outcome is 
under their control. Langer (1975) stated that the illusion of control is there when an individual 
subjectively expects a probability of personal success improperly higher than the objective 
probability.   
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2.3.4 Forms of Overconfidence 
There are many forms of overconfidence that have been extensively studied in the fields of 
psychology and behavioural finance. They have been examined on both individual and 
corporate level. Their relevant research includes many areas or settings that are in the finance 
and investment disciplines as well as finance-irrelevant knowledge domains. The three main 
forms of overconfidence are overestimation, over-placement and over precision.  
Overestimation: the major factors that drive overestimation are wishful thinking and 
optimistic forecasts (Sharot, 2011). For example, some investors are always optimistic and 
believe that the value of the property in the housing market will only rise. Such a way of 
thinking strongly represents overconfidence. 
This case doesn’t only happen in the property market but in any asset class in the financial 
market. Previous research documented some findings about investors’ overestimation of 
anticipated performance (Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999). Even outside the 
finance discipline, people overestimate their abilities, level of control, performance and their 
chances of success. For instance, Clayson (2005) found that students’ belief in their 
performance on the exams they take are overestimated. Another example is doctors diagnosis 
on their patients, as Christensen-Szalanski and  Bushyhead (1981) stated that physicians 
diagnosis’ accuracy is overestimated. Accordingly, investors will overestimate the likelihood 
of an investment to have a desired outcome in the future.  
Over-placement: it is a well-established bias which makes individuals exaggerate their 
judgement, and makes them very confident that they are better than others. Over-placement is 
acknowledged to be present globally (Beer & Hughes, 2010; Sharot, 2011). 
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2.3.5 Gender Differences  
Studies that investigate the difference between men and women trading activity was 
conducted by Barber and Odean (2001) and Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009). The 
authors found that men trade more than women in both stocks and options’ markets, while men 
tended to perform weaker and have lower returns as a result. Bauer et al., (2009) also stated 
that psychological research shows that men are more overconfident than women. Bauer et al. 
(2009) conducted further analysis and investigated the trading activity of only single-only men 
and women, and they found that single men trade more than single women by 67%, and the 
return is therefore reduced by 1.44 percentage points more than women (per year). 
Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1977) found that men tend to spend more time and 
resources on stocks and financial securities analysis than women, as well as depend less on 
their brokers. The authors also found that men believe they have a good ability to predict returns 
and expect higher returns than women do, after they analysed brokerage records and survey 
answers between 1964 and 1970. In view of that, overconfidence is more present in men than 
women.  
2.3.6 Volume of Trading  
Further evidence was found in regards to the relationship between overconfidence and the 
volume of trading (Barber & Odean, 2002). They found that when investors changed their 
brokerage accounts to online trading, after it was just telephone-based trading, they have 
performed worse than before, even with the lower trading cost associated with online trading. 
This is because of the high trading frequency which is most probably caused by overconfidence 
(Barber & Odean, 2002). 
Overconfidence makes people or investors believe they always make correct decisions. This 
matter can result from investors’ belief that their view and judgement are better than what they 
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really are (Benos, 1998). This is consistent with Gervais and Odean (2001), as the authors 
explained that overconfident investors are less good than they believe they are. The authors 
also found out that aggressive investing is associated with lower expected profits. 
Although investors can gain more knowledge and education about the financial market, the 
way they perceive themselves will not change; they will only be able to change the way they 
see the market (Menkhoff & Nikiforow, 2009). Therefore, overconfidence is not inherent to 
the market, but to the person himself, and even education can’t remove this bias. 
Aggressive trading leads to an increase in trading volume with lower expected profits 
(Gervais & Odean, 2001). This means that the expected profit of a successful investor may be 
even lower than the unsuccessful one.  So, investors may not as good as they think they are. 
Barber and Odean (2000) investigated the relationship between individual performance and 
overconfidence. The authors showed that investors who trade more frequently have lower 
returns than those who trade less, net of trading costs. 
Overconfident investors may have access to private information which makes them react to 
it. They may also contribute their success to their skills, while blaming factors that are out of 
their control when they fail. This problem is known as self-attribution (Chuang & Lee, 2006). 
According to the prospect theory, people will sell their winning investments while keeping 
their losing ones to avoid regret. In light of this, investors consider both past and future 
performance when selling shares, but only consider future performance when buying them 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2013). 
2.3.7 Overconfidence and Investments 
Overconfidence has attracted many researchers after it proved to have serious implications 
for the decision-making process and investment performance. Decisions made during trading 
(Glaser & Weber, 2007), saving (Sakalaki et al., 2005), participating in the financial market 
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(Xia et al., 2014) and many more have all been investigated extensively, in addition to securities 
performance (Barber & Odean, 2000; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Eichholtz 
& Yönder, 2015; Janus, Jinjarak, & Uruyos, 2013).  
From what is discussed earlier in this chapter, and since overconfidence has a major role at 
the time of making investment decisions, this trait can lead to many extreme scenarios in the 
financial market. Important examples of these scenarios are bubbles (Scheinkman & Xiong, 
2003; Shiller, 2003), volatility (Barber & Odean, 2000; Odean, 1998; Shiller, 2003) and 
excessive trading (Statman, Thorley, & Vorkink, 2006). 
The quality of information available to investors, stakeholders and the board of directors 
might be affected by the CEOs (Adams & Ferreira, 2007), thus affecting the investment 
decisions of the company. The behavioural biases of the CEOs, especially overconfidence, also 
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Source: Bao & Li (2016) 
2.3.8 Overconfidence and Cashflow 
Many studies investigated the reasons behind investors and managers’ irrational investment 
behaviour. In corporations, one main factor that causes CEOs’ overconfidence is cashflow, or 
availability of cash, especially in equity dependent firms (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) argued that there is a tension between the markets and CEOs’ 
beliefs about the value of the firm, a matter which significantly links the levels of investment 
and cashflows. CEOs may overestimate the return of potential new projects if they have 
sufficient funds and are not constrained by the mechanisms of corporate governance, pushing 
them to invest more. However, if they do not have enough internal cash, they will not issue 
new shares to collect the necessary funds, as they believe that such action will cause the stock 




Figure 9: Differences in Firm Valuation 
 
Source: Malmendier and Tate (2015) 
2.3.9 Behavioural Finance and Overconfidence on the Corporate Level 
Most of the studies investigated overconfidence on the individual investors level, but there 
are just a little research on the managerial level. Malmendier and Tate (2005) studied the 
overconfidence on the managerial level. The authors proved that the availability of cash flow 
makes overconfident CEOs invest more. Also, Malmendier & Tate (2008) investigated the 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and mergers and acquisition. The authors 
found out that decisions made by overconfident CEOs for a merger were value-destroying. 
Overconfident people put weight on their experience (Ritter, 2003). This is consistent with 
Billett and Qian (2008) who found that if CEOs were engaged in a successful merger, their 
confidence will get stronger. This will make them engage in more acquisitions, but the 
following acquisitions are not found to be profitable. 
Overconfidence is one of the most important cognitive biases that may lead investors to 
make wrong investment decisions (Ritter, 2003). The author stated that investors tend to invest 
more in the company that they work for.  
REIT’s managers sell their winning properties while holding to their losing one since 
acquisition (Crane & Hartzell, 2010). This is in line with the prospect theory, which says that 
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people tend to avoid regret by selling their winning investments, while keeping their losing 
ones. 
2.4 Review of Corporate Governance, Overinvestment and Underinvestment 
Problems of overinvestment and underinvestment could rise due to the conflict of interests 
between the stakeholders of the company. This conflict has a huge influence on the investment 
policies, corporate governance and capital structure of the firm. Overinvestment and 
underinvestment could be caused by a conflict of interest between investors and managers 
(Cariola et al., 2005), in which managers may misuse their power during the decision-making 
process. 
This may damage the interest of the shareholders and debt holders, as managers may 
excessively invest in risky and unprofitable projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The authors 
stressed that the total value of the firm will drop given that CEOs consider their roles as more 
important of that of shareholders, a matter which rises the conflict and subsequently produces 
opportunistic behaviour. 
There are many forms of overinvestment. It could be related to the financial resources that 
a company has (Jensen, 1986). Instead of using free cash-flow to distribute dividends, the 
author stated that managers are using it for opportunistic purposes and investment in 
nonprofitable projects. Such behaviour could create an expansion beyond the optimal level and 
lead to the empire-building phenomenon. In this case, the firm size will increase but not its 
value.  
This issue contradicts with the interest of the shareholders. Excessively increasing the firm 
size could only be for the benefit of the managers (Degryse & De Jong, 2001). So, managers 
seek to invest more in projects even if the projects have negative net present value (NPV).  
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Another form of overinvestment can be related to the overconfidence of CEOs. Even if 
managers have good intentions and are trying their best to serve the best interest of the company 
and shareholders (by maximising the value for them), they may overestimate their managerial 
abilities and do the same mistake through investing in projects that appear to have a negative 
NPV (Stein, 2003). 
As emphasized in the previous sections, managers may unintentionally exaggerate their own 
skills, thus they will not evaluate the risk and uncertainties associated with the new investments 
carefully (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Although the overinvestment problem is very common, 
it can be mitigated and reduced when a company applies a regular and consistent evaluation of 
its capital (Jensen, 1986). To illustrate, if funds allocation is regularly evaluated to see where 
money should be used, such as using it in new projects, debt recourse etc., then the conflict 
between the managers and shareholders will effectively be dealt with. 
Following this method will limit the managers’ discretion in using the resources of the 
company and the agency, hence they will properly allocate the free-cash flow. As debt recourse 
has been just used as an example, this action can limit the in-efficient usage of cash-flow, as 
reimbursing the loan along with its interest happen before any new project can be funded 
(Cariola et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, the underinvestment problem is related to the agency relationship and 
conflict of interest between the debtholders and shareholders (Cariola et al., 2005), considering 
that managers may work to serve the best interest of shareholders over the interest of 
debtholders. 
Managers can refuse to invest in projects that have positive net present value because of the 
relationships of high debt (Myers, 1977), as financial leverage may decrease the firm value. 
Under those circumstances, Myers (1977) found the shareholders will not accept to finance 
53 
 
investment projects that may also be associated with risky debt, as most of the benefits will 
then go in favour of the debtholders. As a result, the manager will decide not to proceed with 
an investment project, even if it is expected to be profitable. 
Although many studies have been done in the US about corporate governance, not much has 
been done in the Australian market despite being an interesting, big and developed market. As 
mentioned before, compliance with all Australian corporate governance regulations is not 
required. 
However, if companies choose not to comply due to some reasons like size, culture, and 
history, they should disclose and explain why a certain rule has not been followed. The case is 
different for the US, where all corporate governance regulations should be followed by the 
firms. Thirty recommendations were first released in 2003 by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, before the 2 new versions in 2007 and 2013. These recommendations are based on 
eight principles which are: 
• “Principle 1: Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
• Principle 2:  Structure the board to add value 
• Principle 3: Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
• Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
• Principle 5: Make timely and balanced disclosure 
• Principle 6: Respect the rights of shareholders 
• Principle 7: Recognise and manage risk 
• Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly” 
As of 2007, an audit company must be established for ASX500 companies. This is an 
obligation which is listed under rule 12.7. Similarly, ASX300 companies are also required to 
establish an audit company and remuneration committee. The ASX has the authority to warn 
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(in writing) the companies that do not follow the corporate governance rules, and even delist 
the company if the regulations are not followed. Since complying with all the rules are 
voluntarily and not mandatory, the quality of corporate governance across the companies will 
significantly vary. 
2.5 Development of Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
After reviewing the literature, it is found that the level and impact of CEOs’ overconfidence 
on corporate investment activity amongst A-REITs have not been investigated before. The 
problem of irrational investing has been investigated a lot on an individual level, but very few 
studies have been made on the corporate and managerial level. CEOs’ overconfidence in the 
REIT market has been addressed. However, the studies that investigated CEOs’ overconfidence 
are limited only to the US-REIT market. 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) investigated the trading activity and performance of REITs in 
the US. The authors found out that there are more investments in REITs in the presence of 
overconfidence. The authors also stated that private information is not what drives 
overconfident managers to buy more of their company shares, because their shares performed 
weakly after the purchase. The results have shown that overconfident CEOs invest more in 
properties than non-overconfident CEOs when enough cash is available, and they documented 
weak investment performance as their decisions led to low NPV projects (Eichholtz & Yönder, 
2015).  
Although this may be true in the US, it is not necessarily true in any other country. With this 
in mind and after reviewing Australian studies, it is crucial to see if overconfidence can play a 
significant role in impacting A-REITs’ investment activities, and if such activities are affected 
and constrained by other factors such as corporate governance. 
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2.5.1 Hypotheses:  
This research tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho1: There is a positive association between CEOs’ overconfidence and property 
acquisition activity. 
Hypothesis 2 
Ho2: There is a negative association between CEOs’ overconfidence and property 
disposition activity.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The behavioural finance literature, as discussed in the previous chapter, suggests that anyone 
is vulnerable to irrational behaviour which can affect the decision-making process, including 
CEOs of listed companies. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between corporate 
and property investment decisions made by CEOs of REITs in Australia. Data collection and 
analysis methods are described in this chapter, and the research design of the study is explained. 
3.2 Data Collection 
To assess the relationship between CEOs’ own share trading as an indicator of their 
overconfidence, and property investments decision-making undertaken during their tenure as 
CEOs of the A-REIT companies, the quantitative methodology has been applied in this study. 
Data sources, measures and sampling strategy are explained in this section. 
3.2.1 Data sources: 
The data were collected from Eikon, DataStream, MorningStar and A-REITs’ annual 
reports. To get started, the names of CEOs were collected from MorningStar and annual 
reports. To see CEOs’ shares ownership, their shareholdings data were collected from Eikon. 
For property investments’ data, the total number of properties and the dollar value of properties 
purchased and sold were also collected from Eikon. Most of the financial variables were 
collected from DataStream. However, where the data were missing for some years, 
MorningStar was used to collect the full complete data.  
3.2.2 Measures and Sampling Strategy: 
The data cover 92 CEOs across 46 A-REITs between 2000 and 2019. Both currently trading 
and delisted companies were included to avoid survivorship bias. However, there are partially 
and totally unavailable data for some A-REITs which resulted in their exclusion of the study. 
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Further, some currently trading companies have also been excluded because they were either 
listed in 2018 or 2019, as the one-year period as a CEO is not enough to examine CEO’s 
behaviour and does not align with the research objectives and methodology, which follow 
previous studies (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). The period of 2000-
2019 has been chosen as it allows for CEOs’ behaviour investigation before, during and after 
the GFC.  
Table 13 shows the companies that have been excluded from the study and the reason for 
exclusion. 
Table 13: Companies Excluded from the Study 
Company Listing/Delisting 
Date 
Reason of Exclusion 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Brookfield Australian 
Opportunities Fund (BAO) 
Delisted Date: 
30/10/2012 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Centro Retail Group (CER) Suspended Date: 
17/08/2005 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




Financial data, including property 
investments data, are not available 
on Eikon 
Commonwealth Property 
Office Fund (CPA) 
Delisted Date: 
23/04/2014 
Financial data, including property 






Reason of Exclusion 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Coonawarra Australia 
Property Trust (CNR) 
Delisted Date: 
30/08/2013 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
EDT Retail Trust (EDT) Delisted Date: 
06/09/2011 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Galileo Japan Trust (GJT) Delisted Date: 
01/11/2016 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
ING Industrial Fund (IIF) Delisted Date: 
31/03/2011 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Intoll Group (ITO) Delisted Date: 
17/12/2010 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 





CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Multiplex European 
Property Fund (MUE) 
Delisted Date: 
18/09/2015 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares’ data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Prime Retirement and Aged 
Care Property Trust (PTN) 
Delisted Date: 
30/08/2012 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 










Reason of Exclusion 
Record Realty (RRT) Delisted Date: 
01/09/2009 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




Financial data, including property 
investments data, are not available 
on Eikon 




Financial data, including property 
investments data, are not available 
on Eikon 




Financial data, including property 
investments data, are not available 
on Eikon 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Westpac Office Trust (WOT) Delisted Date: 
05/08/2010 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
APN European Retail 
Property Group (AEZ) 
Delisted Date: 
04/09/2012 
CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 




CEO shares data are not available 
on Eikon. 
Propertylink Group (PLG) Listed Date: 
29/04/2019 





Period: less than two years 




Period: less than two years 
 
3.3 Research Method and Strategy 
A researcher can decide to use a quantitative or qualitative method to find an answer to a 
particular question which is still not addressed in the existing literature. Every research 
question is different and distinct, a matter which requires a different approach for finding its 
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answer. Also, each method requires certain skills and resources that need to be available at the 
time of conducting research. Nonetheless, every study requires the usage of the appropriate 
method to reach the proper results. 
There are huge differences between qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative 
methods do not involve any numerical data, but only words or language. It helps to provide 
rich data and in-depth information and pictures. This helps explain the way and reason behind 
things happening. There many sources and techniques used to collect qualitative data. The most 
common ones are interviews, focus groups, observations and secondary data.  
The data collected from the mentioned sources can be analysed using a variety of methods, 
which mostly involve coding and structuring data into themes. This can be done with the help 
of well-developed computer application and software such as NVivo. Quantitative research, on 
the other hand, is concerned with numerical data which are analysed using statistical methods. 
The most important sources of quantitative data are surveys, observations and secondary data.  
Table 14 outlines some differences between quantitative and qualitative methods: 
Table 14: Differences Between Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies 
Research Aspect Quantitative Qualitative  
Common Purpose Test hypotheses or specific 
research questions 
Discover ideas, used in Exploratory 
Research with general research 
objectives 
 





Unstructured, Free-Form  
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Research Aspect Quantitative Qualitative  
Research 
Independence 
Researcher is an uninvolved 
observer: results are 
objective 
Researcher is intimately involved: 
results are subjective 
 
Samples Large samples to produce 
generalizable results 
Small Samples – often in natural 
settings 
 
Most often Used Descriptive and casual 
research designs 
Exploratory Research designs  
Source: Yeong (2011) 
This study has chosen the quantitative method because of the limitation of qualitative one 
given the nature of the topic addressed. In case the qualitative method was followed, the most 
appropriate technique that would have been used is conducting interviews with the CEOs. In 
general, doing an interview is a very useful method, as it allows a researcher to have in-depth 
data and/or information about the investigated issue. 
Doing an interview also makes the researcher discover the opinion of the interviewees, as 
well as find out the reasons behind their actions and way of thinking. However, having an 
interview to investigate CEOs’ investment behaviour would have not been appropriate because 
of the following reasons: 
1. The overconfidence bias is very dangerous in the financial market, and it will be perceived 
by the CEOs as a bad thing to have (which it actually is), a matter that would push them to 
answer the questions in a way that shows that they are not overconfident. Overconfidence is a 
bias that might not be controlled by the one who has it, and many individuals do not even notice 
they are behaving irrationally.  
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2. The interviewee must be aware of the research details and objectives. So, any question 
that will be asked would be perceived as biased (which may actually be) to prove or show 
CEOs and corporate overconfidence, even if the questions asked are not directly related to this 
bias. 
3. Conducting interviews is time-consuming and is not a good option considering the limited 
time of the Master of Research program, as setting up interviews with more than 50 CEOs from 
different companies, then transcribing, analysing and reporting the results are beyond this 
research timeframe and resources. 
4. Conducting interviews with many CEOs are very costly. 
Not only qualitative techniques were considered, but also quantitative techniques like a 
survey. However, despite being an easy data collection tool, cost-effective, and time-efficient, 
it has not been considered as the survey’s reliability will be questioned given the nature of the 
study. The following issues have been considered and surveys have been excluded from the 
study as a result: 
• CEOs may not be encouraged to give accurate answers  
• CEOs may not put themselves in unfavourable situations and manners, would not 
provide some answers or may decide not to fill up the survey. 
• Rates of response: In case the rate is low, it will create bias and therefore leads to an 
unreliable data collection technique. 
3.4 Overconfidence and Investment Examination; Research Method and Strategy 
After reviewing the existing overconfidence literature, this study conducts a quantitative 
approach. Past studies about corporate financing policies, real estate and behavioural finance 
have been reviewed to find a comparable method and model. In order to find out whether CEOs 
are overconfident or not, the relationship between their corporate property investments and 
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personal shares’ investment, corporate cash, debt and operational performance should be 
investigated. 
3.4.1 CEO Shares and Property Investments 
CEOs are already exposed to company-specific risk as their personal wealth depends on the 
company they work for, such as their compensation, wages and pension plan. Having this in 
mind, if CEOs keep buying shares of their companies, it is a clear indication that CEOs are 
very confident of their firms’ success, performance and fortunes (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). 
It is worth remembering that they have the opportunity of diversifying their market portfolio, 
by investing in other companies from different industries.  
CEOs’ phenomenon of buying more shares of their own company’s stock was documented 
before (Billett & Qian, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008). The authors classified CEOs 
as overconfident when they buy more shares than they sell. Managers’ failure to avoid more 
exposure to their companies’ risk, which they already are vulnerable to, indicates their 
overestimation of their companies’ returns in the future. 
Billet and Qian stated that CEOs’ past success has a huge influence on their future decisions 
and found that they are overconfident, in a study they conducted to explore CEOs’ behaviour 
and decision-making process during mergers and acquisitions. They have also found that 
successful acquisitions, where a CEO was involved, made him or her engage more in similar 
projects, but these new acquisition projects were not profitable anymore.  
To explain some phenomena in the financial world, many researchers focused on 
overconfidence to help clarify why such phenomena took place (Billett & Qian, 2008; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015; Fischhoff, Slovic, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Hilary & Menzly, 2006; Hirshleifer & Luo, 2001; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2015). Moreover, self-attribution was used to explain investors’ behaviour 
64 
 
and overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998). Even analysts’ behaviour was examined by Hilary 
and Menzly (2006), and they found that self-attribution bias is leading investment analysts to 
be overconfident after experiencing short-term success. In light of this, Billett and Qian (2008) 
stated that directors can be among the highest influencers on their companies and their assets’ 
prices.  
It is expected that firms’ investments to increase when CEOs are overconfident (Eichholtz 
& Yönder, 2015). On the other hand, the authors stressed that A-REITs’ property sales are 
expected to decrease if CEOs are overconfident. Glaser and Weber (2007) have investigated 
the corporate investment activity and they have separated buying and selling activities. In view 
of that, this research follows their method and investigates both property acquisition and 
disposition activities separately.  
Taking into consideration the previous literature that indicates CEOs’ personal and 
corporate excessive trading activity, this study investigates the relationship between CEOs’ 
personal share trading and their corporate property acquisition and disposition activities. 
Further, CEOs were only considered and included in this study if they were in their managerial 
position for at least two years, following (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). If CEOs buy more shares 
while also investing excessively in properties, this indicates a corporate overconfidence 
behaviour. The same matter applies for the property sales, which means a decrease in properties 
sales reflects CEOs’ overconfidence impact on A-REITs’ strategies and behaviour. 
3.4.2 Investment Activity and Cash Availability  
If CEOs are overconfident, they will only invest more if they have too much internal funds 
at their disposal, which implies that investments are highly sensitive to cash availability and 
other financing options that CEOs consider cheap (Malmendier & Tate, 2015). The authors 
state that rational CEOs, or non-overconfident CEOs, avoid this mistake and make investment 
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decisions regardless of the financing options available, as long as investments are value-
maximizing. 
Figure 10: Overconfidence and Early-Life Experiences  
 
Source: Malmendier and Tate (2011) 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) found that US-REITs’ CEOs invest more in real estate when 
they have enough cash and sell fewer properties than non-overconfident CEOs when a 
company has more cash. They explained that overconfident CEOs are very certain of the 
decisions they are making and believe that such decisions will have a positive outcome, a matter 
that will make them sell the properties at a later stage when the properties reach a desired value 
higher than the current price in the market. 
As a result, overconfidence had a negative effect on the sales of property. In view of that, 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) suggested that such activities could be caused by the empire-
building behaviour where overconfident CEOs invested more to create a greater portfolio size 
than other companies’ CEOs. 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) focused on the characteristics of companies’ management and 
decision-makers instead of the characteristics on the firm-level. They found that when there 
are sufficient cash and firms are not disciplined by the corporate governance guidelines, CEOs 
tend to overinvest. Therefore, they will not issue new shares because of the tension between 
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the market beliefs and theirs. To clarify, CEOs are concerned the market may undervalue the 
stock of the company if new equity is issued. In view of that, Malmeinder and Tate (2005) 
stated that the availability of cash-flow gives the CEOs the chance to make new investments 
as per their desires. On the other hand, rational CEOs do not only focus on cash availability, 
and are willing to invest for what is best for the firm (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Moreover, if 
there are cash constraints, the authors propose that CEOs’ overinvestment can then be mitigated 
when managers consider financing costs.  
This study investigates the relationship between cash and property acquisition and 
disposition activities activities. So, the dependent variable (Property Acquisition) will be 
regressed against CEOs’ shares trading of their own companies, cash and other dependent 
variables that will be stated in the following sections. 
3.4.3 Investment Activity and Financial Leverage 
Debt is one major financing option that companies consider for new investment projects. To 
understand the capital structure and its impact on the value of the firm, many researchers 
examined the structure’s development and utilization (Fairchild, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), where they studied how such development can solve agency problems, including a 
problem based on managerial irrationality. Therefore, more research has been devoted to study 
how behavioural biases may impact finance decisions made by managers and corporations. 
Overconfidence is widely recognized as a behavioural trait that plays a significant role in 
managers’ finance decisions. It encourages managers to rely heavily on debt (Shefrin, 2001). 
Overconfident CEOs tends to choose higher levels of debt financing and issue new debt more 




Figure 11: Managerial Overconfidence and Life-cycle Debt  
 
Source: Fairchild (2007) 
As mentioned before, much of research has been done on overconfidence (Eichholtz & 
Yönder, 2015; Fairchild, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2015; Moore & Schatz, 2017), as 
well as financing decisions determinants (Malmendier et al., 2011; Myers, 1977; Myers & 
Majiuf, 1984). However, new research has been conducted about financing decisions’ 
determinants especially after the emergence of behavioural finance which contradicts 
traditional theories (Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 2008). 
Malmendier et al. (2011) found few significant determinants of financing decisions made 
by overconfident managers. While such managers tend to use cash instead of costly external 
financing, they prefer to issue debt instead of equity if they need more funds for a project when 
they seek external capital. 
This study investigates the relationship between property investments and debt. 
Accordingly, debt ratio will be included in the regression model.  
3.4.4 Model and Data Analysis 
Raw data have to be processed and become information, in the forms of statistics and tables, 
so that it can be objectively meaningful to a reader (Thornhill, Saunders, & Lewis, 2009). The 
68 
 
data were screened before processing it, and missing data were checked and treated. The 
missing data were therefore collected from other sources to make it ready for processing. The 
sources of data were Eikon, DataStream, MorningStar and annual reports. Accordingly, the 
data were ready for processing after being verified. 
After analysing the data using EVIEWs, this research looks at the statistical significance 
and correlation coefficient between the dependant variable and independent variables. As 
discussed previously in this chapter, the relationship between CEOs’ shares and property 
investments, cash and property investments as well as corporate debt and property investments 
are investigated. 
Two equations are used to separately analyse the acquisition and disposition activities of 
properties, and to see the relationship of CEO’ shares, corporate cash and debt with these 
activities. The results of the study will be presented in the findings chapter.  
To make the model of this study comparable to research that has already been done on 
overconfidence, previous research papers are carefully reviewed to develop a model for 
properly reach logical results that provide a good understanding of corporate overconfidence 
in A-REIT companies. The models of this study have been developed based on previous 
literature on overconfidence. 
However, different country means different data sources, and not all types of data and 
variables of the previous studies, that can be easily obtained for US-REITs, can be available 
and/or accessible for A-REITs. The following section explains the method and models of the 
most similar study to this research, and describe how the models of this study have been 
constructed, taking into consideration the master’s program duration and resources as well as 
available data and/or access to A-REITs’ data. 
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3.4.5 Method of Past US-REITs’ Overconfidence Study 
In their investigation of US-REITs CEOs’ behaviour and overconfidence, Eichholtz & 
Yönder (2015) used both acquisition and disposition activities as dependant variables (in 
separate equations), and also used, in another model, real estate investment growth as a proxy 
of corporate investment activity. 
Such data was obtained from SNL Financial (a data source that is not available for me at 
this stage). They have also incorporated cash (cash-stock) instead of free cashflow, as the free 
cash flow is not available for investments because of the 90% payout rule in the US, which is 
high like A-REITs’ payout ratio.  
3.4.6 Regression Analysis 
As discussed in the previous sections, this research aimed to develop a model or models that 
can study CEOs’ overconfidence by reviewing the behavioural finance and real estate 
literature. Accordingly, the following models have been developed: 
First model: Property purchase (the dependent variable) is regressed against 5 independent 
variables which are CEOs’ Shares Investments, Cash, Funds from Operations, Market Value 
and Debt Ratio. 
• Model 1: 
Yp = β0+ β1O1+ β2C1+ β3F1+ β4 M1+ β5D1 
Yp: Property Acquisition 
O1: CEOs shares investments 
C1: Cash 
F1: Funds from Operations  
M1: Market Value 
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D1: Debt to total assets (Debt ratio) 
Second Model: Property Sales (the dependent variable) is regressed against 5 independent 
variables which are Shares Investments, Cash, Funds from Operations, Total Assets and Debt 
Ratio. 
• Model 2: 
Ys= β0+ β1O1+ β2C1+ β3F1+ β4T1+ β5D1 
Where Ys is the sales of property, and T1 is the Total Assets.  
Therefore, the hypotheses that are developed are: 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho1: There is a positive association between CEOs’ overconfidence and property 
acquisition activity. 
Hypothesis 2 
Ho2: There is a negative association between CEOs’ overconfidence and property 
disposition activity. 
3.5 Methods, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As stressed in this chapter, this research reviews existing property, behavioural finance, 
overconfidence and corporate governance studies to develop a methodology that can help 




Table 15: Questions, Hypotheses and Methods 
Research Questions Hypotheses Methods 
RQ1: What is the 
impact of CEOs’ 











 -Property acquisition activity 
(dependant variable) is regressed 
against CEOs’ own shares trading of 
their A-REITs’ stock (Independent 
variable), following (Billett & Qian, 
2008; Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
 
RQ2: What is the 
impact of CEOs’ 





Ho2: There is a negative 
association between 
CEOs’ overconfidence 
and property disposition 
activity. 
 
-Property disposition activity 
(dependant variable) is regressed 
against CEOs’ own shares trading of 
their A-REIT’s stock (Independent 
variable), following (Billett & Qian, 
2008; Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
 
The CEOs whom are considered in this study are the ones who have at least two years 
appearance as A-REITs’ CEOs. This is because a period that is less than two years is not 
considered sufficient enough to examine CEOs’ behaviour (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). If 
CEOs are buying more shares of their companies’, this means that they are very confident of 
their companies’ performance. 
As stressed before, CEOs have the opportunity to diversify their portfolio through investing 
in many other assets. So, if CEOs are buying more shares of their companies’ throughout their 
years as CEOs, while their wealth is also already exposed to their firms’ specific risk (such as 
72 
 
their compensation, wages and pension plan), then this indicates that they are overconfident 
(Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). 
Accordingly, CEOs’ shares trading is separately explored to see how many CEOs are 
overconfident.  
3.6 Conclusion 
If time is available, this study could have attempted to follow both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, through conducting interviews with the CEOs along with using the 
secondary data. It would have opened an extra scope to identify additional reasons or factors 
behind investment decisions they have made, or explored special circumstances that could be 
missed from just using the quantitative data. 
However, the one-year research period of the Master of Research program does not allow 
conducting many interviews (given they all accept or are available to hold one). Furthermore, 
the exclusion of many delisted companies, because of data unavailability, may affect the results 




Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
The data cover 46 A-REITs and 92 CEOs. The data are analysed following the literature 
discussed in the methodology chapter. This chapter presents the outcome of the analysis, 
discusses the findings and compares the results with previous management and finance studies. 
4.2 Overconfidence Findings:  
CEOs’ shareholding is used as an indicator of overconfidence of a CEO. As discussed by 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015), if CEOs buy shares of their A-REITs, this significantly increases 
their exposure to their companies’ specific risk, because they are already exposed to this risk 
as all their wages, compensation and pension plan is related to their companies’ performance. 
So, buying their companies’ shares indicates that CEOs are overconfident of their companies’ 
return, performance or fortunes under their management (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). Also, it 
is worth noting CEOs having the opportunity to diversify their portfolio by investing in many 
other stocks or assets other than their companies’ shares. 
CEOs are classified as overconfident if they buy or are consistently buying shares of their 
companies, following Eichholtz and Yönder (2015). This study follows Eichholtz and Yönder 
(2015) by classifying CEOs as overconfident for their tenure period as CEOs (not the whole 
sample period of 2000-2019) if they are found to buy shares of their companies, as 
overconfidence is considered as habitual behaviour. As highlighted by Eichholtz and Yönder 
(2015), they “define a CEO as overconfident if he or she is a net buyer of his or her own 
company stocks throughout the sample period”. A consistent approach has also been applied 
for other managerial overconfidence studies, where Billet and Qian (2008) investigated CEOs’ 
purchase of stocks prior to mergers and acquisitions and stated that “if the CEO develops her 
(over)confidence over time, we expect such increased optimism to manifest in her trading of 
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the company stock”. The analysis also follows the Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) by including 
CEOs that have at least 2 years appearance as A-REITs’ CEOs. So, CEOs that only stayed one 
year in their managerial position are excluded from this study, as the one-year period is not 
enough to examine CEOs’ behaviour (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). 
It is found that 63 out of 92 CEOs are overconfident (for the period 2000-2019). So, around 
68% of A-REITs’ CEOs are overconfident during this period. On the other hand, 29 CEOs 
have not been involved in any of their companies’ shares purchase in open market operations. 
In the US, 34% of US REITs’ CEOs were classified as overconfident for those that had at least 
2 years appearance in their managerial position (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). However, it is 
worth noting that the authors’ study covers a period of just 7 years (2003-2010), while this 
research covers a greater period (2000-2019). 
It is important to mention that most of A-REITs’ CEOs tend to sell all their shares after they 
leave their positions, which implies that they were not investing for the long term. Further, the 
degree of overconfidence varies over the 20 years period. As displayed in Figure 12, there is 
evidence of an increase in the overconfidence of A-REITs’ CEOs overtime, albeit this is 
associated with the fact that more A-REITs are being created. Figure 12 shows the increase in 





Figure 12: Degree Variation of Overconfidence (in Percentage) 
 
Source: Compiled and Constructed from Eikon 
Note: This figure has been constructed by taking the average of CEOs that bought shares during 
their tenure in the managerial position. 
Figure 12 reflects the average of overconfident CEOs that bought shares during their tenure 
in the managerial position. While this figure has not reflected that overconfident CEOs 
constitute 68% of the sample, this because the majority of the CEOs have not stayed in their 
position for the whole sample period (2000-2019). Also, tenure periods vary among CEOs, 
which also impacted figure 12 estimations. However, taking the total sample period together 
into consideration, 68% of CEOs were overconfident. 
 According to Eichholtz and Yönder (2015), CEOs are classified as overconfident during 
their whole period in the managerial position if they are buying shares during their tenure. So, 
even if a CEO does not buy a share during just one particular year, it does not mean he or she 
is not overconfident. Accordingly, figure 12 reflects CEOs as overconfident during their whole 





































































































Overall, there is an evidence that the majority of A-REITs’ CEOs are overconfident for the 
period 2000-2019. This raises an issue of how these will affect A-REITs’ investment activities. 
Do A-REITs’ CEOs tend to buy more properties? Do they tend to sell less properties?  
4.2.1 Models’ Results  
To see if the results are statistically significant, a researcher looks at the p-value which 
shows whether the results reached are due to chances or not. If the p-value, which is provided 
by statistical hypothesis testing, is 5% or lower, then results found can be considered as 
statistically significant. If the p-value is higher than 5%, then the results are considered found 
by chance. 
Table 16: Model 1 Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.8169 0.7467 1.0164 
Constant, CEO Shares, Cash, FFO, MV and Debt Ratio 
 










Prob.   
C 2.5099 5.5991 0.4482 0.6544 
CEO Shares 0.2377 0.1594 1.4913 0.1372 
LNCASH -0.2043 0.0933 -2.1891** 0.0296 
LNFUNDS_FROM_OPERATIONS -0.1349 0.2383 -0.5659 0.5720 
LNMV 0.9954 0.3057 3.2560*** 0.0013 
DEBT RATIO 1.7564 1.0819 1.6234 0.1058 
Note: the dependent variable is Property Investment (Property Acquisition); ** and *** 




Table 17 shows the regression results from Model 1 analysis by using property acquisition 
activity of A-REITs as the dependant variable based on the value and volume of the 
transactions. This analysis is carried out to assess the relationship between A-REITs’ property 
investment activities with that of the CEO’s level of confidence. 
The results of the regression analysis indicate that there is a positive coefficient between A-
REITs’ property acquisition activities as the dependent variable and CEOs’ shares trading as 
the independent variable. This shows that A-REIT companies have the tendency to acquire 
more properties as CEOs accumulate more shares in their own companies. This may be 
explained by the fact that overconfident CEOs have a more optimistic corporate investment 
strategy that is reflected through, amongst other things, more aggressive property acquisition 
activities. However, it is worth noting that this is found not to be statistically significant (p-
value = 0.1372). These results are different from what is found in the US, since Eichholtz and 
Yönder (2015) found a significant evidence that overconfident CEOs increase the property 
acquisition activities of their REITs. The divergence of the results suggests the importance of 
international evidence. More specifically, A-REITs and US REITs are trading under distinct 
settings, including but not limited to, corporate governance. Further discussion about this 
divergence is required and will be held in the “discussion” section. 
Further, the analysis also indicates a negative coefficient (-0.2044) between A-REITs’ cash 
level and property acquisition activity, and this relationship is found to be significant at a 5% 
level. Specifically, for every 1% increase in the property acquisition volume will result in a 
0.2% decrease in cash. This result is also corroborated with the positive estimation by using 
the debt ratio (1.76) as the explanatory variable, albeit a statistically insignificant result. This 
relationship is not unpredictable as A-REIT companies are expected to use a combination of 
existing cash stock and leverage as they seek to expand the size of their investment portfolios, 
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thus explaining the decrease in the A-REITs’ cash level and the increase in liabilities (debt 
level). 
The results also exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship at 1% significance 
level between the asset acquisition activity of A-REITs and their market value. As A-REITs’ 
primary business activity is investing in income-producing assets with a long-term holding 
period, the positive impact on their market value from the acquisition activities has been 
correctly identified in this analysis. 
In addition, the analysis also indicates a negative coefficient (-0.1349) between A-REITs’ 
Funds from Operations (FFO) and property acquisition activity, which indicates that an 
increase in property investments is associated with a decrease in operational performance. 
However, it is not found to be statistically significant (p-value=0.5720). Table 16 shows that 
81.69% of the variation in property acquisition activity is explained by the changes in the 
independent variables. 
 
Table 18: Model 2 Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.6738 0.5135 1.4638 















Prob.   
C 6.7518 10.2246 0.6603 0.5099 
CEO Shares -0.3586 0.2703 -1.3264 0.1864 
LNCASH 0.5108 0.1509 3.3850*** 0.0009 
LNFUNDS_FROM_OPERATIONS 0.0226 0.2663 0.0848 0.9325 
LNTA 0.0867 0.5586 0.1553 0.8767 
DEBT RATIO -0.5153 1.7917 -0.2876 0.7740 
Note: the dependent variable is Property Sales (Property Disposition); *** indicates 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors were employed.  
Table 19 shows the regression results from model 2 analysis by using property disposition 
activity of A-REITs as a dependent variable based on the value and volume of transactions. 
This analysis carried out to assess the relationship between A-REITs’ property selling activities 
with that of CEOs’ level of overconfidence. 
The results of the regression analysis indicate that there is a negative coefficient between A-
REITs’ property disposition activities as the dependent variable and CEOs’ shares trading as 
the independent variable. This shows that A-REIT companies have the tendency to sell less 
properties as CEOs acquire more shares in their companies. However, this relationship is found 
not to be statistically significant (p-value = 0.1864). Results here are not in line with the 
findings of Eichholtz and Yönder, (2015). The authors found that overconfident CEOs decrease 
their REITs’ property disposition activity. Their results imply that overconfident CEOs tend to 
sell less properties (while also buying more) to create a greater size of portfolio than other 
CEOs, which reflects the empire-building behaviour. On the other hand, there is no statistical 
evidence in this study that A-REITs’ CEOs are doing the same thing. In like manner to model 
“1” results, since the results are not in line with the results of the US study of Eichholtz and 
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Yönder, (2015), then this also implies that the special settings of corporate governance may 
have a significant impact on A-REITs’ trading strategies. The “discussion” section will discuss 
the potential role of corporate governance in A-REITs’ managerial decision-making process. 
Further, the analysis also indicates a positive coefficient (0.5108) between A-REITs’ cash 
level and property disposition activity, and this relationship is found to be significant at a 5% 
level (p-value = 0.009). Specifically, for every 1% increase in the property disposition volume 
will result in a 0.51% increase in cash. This result is also collaborated with the estimation by 
using the debt ratio (-0.51) as the explanatory variable, albeit a statistically insignificant result. 
This relationship is not unpredictable as the property sales are going to increase the cash level 
while also decreasing debt level because of debt repayments, hence reducing the amount of A-
REITs’ liabilities (debt level). The results also exhibit a weak positive and not statistically 
significant coefficient between property disposition activity and A-REITs’ Total Assets, which 
indicates that the total assets of A-REITs are not impacted much from property sales. Table 18 
shows that 67.38% of the variation in property disposition activity is explained by the changes 
in the independent variables. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 




Table 20: Hypotheses and Results 
Hypotheses Results Accept/Reject 
Ho1: There is a positive association between CEOs’ 






Ho2: There is a negative association between CEO 








In other words, both hypotheses are rejected, reflecting that overconfident CEOs did not either 
tend to buy or sell more properties. The results are not consistent with the previous findings in 
the US. Importantly, a greater discussion of the divergence is required. Specifically, the unique 
characteristics of A-REITs will be discussed. 
4.3 Discussion 
This research aimed to examine the relationship between CEOs’ own share trading as an 
indicator of their overconfidence and investment decision-making undertaken during their 
tenure as CEOs of the A-REIT companies. On this basis, the results have shown that there is a 
statistically insignificant positive association between A-REITs’ property acquisition activities 
and CEOs’ shares investing. These results show that there is no statistical evidence to indicate 
that overconfident CEOs are likely to invest more and to adopt an aggressive investment 
strategy. Also, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that overconfident CEOs tend to 
reduce their property selling activities as they acquire more shares of their companies, as results 
indicate a statistically insignificant correlation (p value= 0.1864). Most importantly, the results 
found in this study contradict what is found in the US (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). The authors 
found the overconfident CEOs of US-REITs tended to increase the property acquisition 
82 
 
activities and decrease the disposition activities. The authors also corroborated their findings 
with US-REITs’ cash availability, as their study has found that CEOs tended to invest more if 
they have sufficient funds. 
A 1% increase in US-REITs’ cash-stock has led to a 3-4% increase in their property 
investments (Eichholtz & Yönder, 2015). Nonetheless, the findings of this study indicate that 
a 1% increase in A-REITs property investments leads to a 0.2% decrease in the cash level. 
Also, the results indicate that a 1% increase in property disposition activity leads to a 0.51% 
increase in cash and 0.51% decrease in debt level, albeit the property disposition activity’s 
correlation with debt is insignificant.  
Eichholtz & Yönder (2015) have looked deeper into the performance of US-REITs after 
they detected the corporate overconfidence. The authors found that US-REITs managed by 
overconfident CEOs had a bad performance. Most importantly, the year following the increase 
in CEOs’ shares ownership, in their own companies, had a worse performance (Eichholtz & 
Yönder, 2015). The authors stressed that an increase in CEOs’ shares may indicate CEOs’ 
overconfidence, but might also imply that they have valuable information about their 
companies. However, US-REITs did not perform well. Regarding the method of this research, 
although the model incorporates an operation performance variable (FFO), this study has not 
conducted further investigations about the performance of A-REITs, as the findings indicated 
that there is no statistical evidence to indicate corporate overconfidence. Further examination 
of performance could have utilized many variables, as FFO is not enough to explore 
companies’ performance. 
The results are believed to have contradicted the previous US-REITs’ research findings for 
one important reason, which is corporate governance. To illustrate, the literature indicates that 
CSR and corporate governance findings are different between the US and Australian markets. 
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Most importantly, corporate governance relationship with US-REITs and A-REITs are not 
found to be the same. As a matter of fact, Newell and Lee (2012) found that corporate 
governance had a great impact on A-REITs while having no significant relationship with US-
REITs. The authors stressed that corporate governance was a key issue for A-REITs’ ongoing 
success, with an emphasis towards the role of independent directors, the board of directors and 
the issues that A-REITs’ decision-makers must consider, such as disclosure and transparency. 
Further, Billett and Qian (2008) emphasized that overconfidence has serious implications 
for corporate governance. Overinvestment problem, which can be caused by CEOs’ 
overconfidence, can be mitigated when a company consistently evaluate its capital (Jensen, 
1986). Hence, this will create limitations which impact CEOs’ discretion in using the financial 
resources of the firm. Since A-REITs are renown to have a strong commitment to CSR and 
corporate governance practices (Newell & Lee, 2012), these same practices are stressed to have 
a great impact on overconfidence (Billett & Qian, 2008). This commitment is corroborated, 
amongst other things, with the evidence of A-REITs’ higher transparency than the US and most 
of the REITs’ markets (JLL, 2018). 
This study further looks at A-REITs’ Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) scores to 
explore their status and A-REITs’ response to CSR and corporate governance practices. The 
scores have been designed by Thomson Reuters (DataStream), a leading source of intelligent 






















- CSR Strategy 
ESG CONTROVERSIES 
SCORE 
Controversies across all 10 categories are aggregated in one category 
score 
ESG COMBINED SCORE Combines ESG score and ESG Controversies score 
Source: Refinitiv (2020)  
Thomson Reuters follows the percentile rank scoring methodology (Refinitiv, 2020). So, a 
score between 0 and 100 is produced. Figure 13 shows the significant average increase in A-
REITs’ ESG scores between 2004 and 2019. 
Figure 13: ESG Scores of A-REITs 
 
Source: Compiled from DataStream 
A-REITs’ ESG scores have been significantly rising in the last two decades. Figure 13 
shows the increase in the three scores separately. The rise in the scores indicates that A-REITs 
85 
 
are seriously applying CSR and corporate governance rules and practices. Further, Figure 14 
shows the A-REITs that have the top 5 ESG combined scores for the period 2004-2019. 
Figure 14: Top 5 ESG combined scores of A-REITs. 
 
Source: Compiled from DataStream 
As indicated in the previous chapters, the quality of corporate governance varies between 
Australian companies, as compliance with corporate governance rules and regulations are not 
mandatory, and this is reflected in figures 13 and 14. Most importantly, since A-REITs’ scores 
indicate that corporate governance rules are seriously considered, this carries important 
implications for CEOs’ investment behaviour, as Billett and Qian (2008) stressed that corporate 
governance greatly impacts overconfidence. 
4.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, and given the discussed facts, it is believed that corporate governance played 
a major role in impacting the variation in corporate overconfidence level across the Australian 
and US-REIT markets. However, further research should be devoted to this area as corporate 
overconfidence, which is already found in the US-REIT market and might be later found in 
other REIT markets, can then be mitigated. Further, no empirical evidence is provided in this 
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research to confirm that corporate governance is the factor that mitigated overconfidence, 
despite ESG scores’ strong implication for this bias. 
The resources (including data availability) and time constraint of the master’s program have 
not allowed for an extensive review of corporate governance methodologies. Accordingly, the 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the findings of this study by presenting the investment behaviour of 
CEOs in the A-REIT market. It then states the importance and significance of the study and 
outlines the contribution to A-REITs and behavioural finance body of research. 
The limitations of this research are discussed, and recommendations for future research will 
be provided. Most importantly, this chapter ends by discussing the implications and stressing 
the importance of conducting further investigations in the domain of overconfidence, corporate 
governance and property.  
5.2 Key Results and Findings 
This research has one primary aim, which is to explore the corporate overconfidence level 
of A-REITs CEOs. The findings that were expected to be found were based on the existing 
studies in the management and finance literature. Based on the overconfidence and real estate 
literature, the expectation was to find overconfident CEOs making irrational corporate 
investment decisions. However, based on the corporate governance literature, this research 
expected the results to be distinct, as previous research on corporate governance in Australia 
has been also different from other countries.  
The findings suggest that there is no evidence to confirm A-REITs’ corporate 
overconfidence. Although the coefficient between CEOs’ own share trading and property 
investments is positive, it is not statistically significant, which implies that the positive relation 
occurred due to chances. The statistically significant relationship between cash and property 
acquisition activity is negative, which shows that overconfident CEOs relied on cash to fund 
their property purchasing projects. Also, the relation between debt and property acquisition 
activity is found to be positive, albeit a statistically insignificant result. However, this is not 
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unpredictable as CEOs and A-REITs are expected to utilize both cash and leverage to expand 
the size of the investment portfolios. The results of Model 2 also show that there is no evidence 
to indicate that overconfident CEOs tend to sell less property. These findings are different from 
what is found in the US. 
It is possible that the different results between this study and the existing overconfidence 
studies, especially the one that Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) have done in the US, are due to 
corporate governance. The management literature shows that there are contradicting results of 
corporate governance studies found among different countries. 
Most importantly, the impact of corporate governance on A-REITs were found to be of great 
significance (Newell & Lee, 2012), while no relationship was found between corporate 
governance and REITs in the US (Bauer et al., 2010; Hartzell, Sun, & Titman, 2006; Khoo et 
al., 1993). Also, Australian investors are changing their approach when they make investment 
decisions and are prioritising corporate governance, environmental and social issues (Newell 
& Lee, 2012). In light of this, A-REITs became a reputable leader in CSR and proved their 
commitment to follow CSR strategies and performance (Newell, 2008), This has taken A-
REITs into success especially after the GFC in 2008, as ASX has required a high level of 
disclosure from publicly listed companies.  
Scholars and researchers have emphasised the role and impact of corporate governance on 
corporate investment behaviour. Corporate overinvestment and underinvestment can be 
mitigated by applying a strong structure of corporate governance (Christensen, Kent, & 
Stewart, 2010). Billett & Qian (2008) stressed that the sources of overconfidence should be 
explored so that proper action and adjustments can be taken in case overconfidence is present 




5.3 Research Questions: Results and Implications. 
The following table recapitulates the objectives of the research questions alongside their 
methods, results and implications. 
Table 22: Methods, Results and Implications 
Research 
Questions 
Methods Results Implications 
RQ1: What is 










variable) is regressed 
against 5 independent 





Value and Debt Ratio. 
 
There is no 
statistical 
evidence to 
confirm that there 







This research found no 
evidence to suggest that 
overconfident managers 
will buy more properties 
during their tenure as CEOs 
of A-REITs. This holds a 
strong implication that 
corporate governance 
played a major role in 
impacting A-REITs’ 
investment behaviour. From 
investors’ perspective, the 
implementation of corporate 
governance practices and 
framework, which is 
reflected in ESG scores and 
Australian management 
literature, makes A-REITs 
more accountable to their 
shareholders. Further, good 
corporate governance 
enables A-REITs to operate 
more efficiently and 






Methods Results Implications 
RQ2: What is 









Property Sales (the 
dependent variable) is 
regressed against 5 
independent variables 




Assets and Debt 
Ratio. 
There is no 
statistical 
evidence to 
confirm that there 






This research found no 
evidence to suggest that 
overconfident CEOs’ 
decrease their A-REITs’ 
property disposition activity 
during their tenure in the 
managerial position. Since 
this not in line with the 
empire-building behaviour, 
where overconfident CEOs 
may tend to impact their 
REITs’ disposition activity 
by selling less (and buying 
more) properties for having 
a bigger size of a portfolio 
than other REITs regardless 
of their performance or 
profitability, then this is an 
indication for investors that 
corporate governance 
practices are being applied 
for the best interest of A-
REITs. So, this suggests that 
A-REITs are operating 
efficiently, which can 
further result in a good 
outcome (return) for their 
investors.  
5.4 Limitations 
This research has some limitations that need to be addressed and can be considered as major 
implications for future research. The study explored the different methods undertaken by 
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renowned scholars and researchers in the field of behavioural finance and overconfidence. This 
present study attempted to follow their methodologies as much as possible to develop models 
that can detect CEOs and corporate overconfidence. 
While the methodology adopted is pretty much comparable to the literature, it lacks some 
variables that were previously utilized in overconfidence studies and models (Eichholtz & 
Yönder, 2015; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Those variables have not been used because of 
resources unavailability and the type of data that can be accessed at this stage, in addition to 
the time needed to collect and analyse such data. Where some of these data can be found in the 
annual reports, it is not possible timewise to search in every company’s annual report for a long 
period of 19 years, which means 19 annual reports for every company.  
Another major limitation is the lack of deeper analysis into the relationship between 
Australian corporate governance application and CEOs’ corporate behaviour. This proposes a 
major question or gap in the overconfidence discipline – are the requirements or practices of 
Australian corporate governance have an impact on CEOs’ overconfidence? 
Furthermore, there are many forms of overconfidence, such as over-precision, 
overestimation and over-placement. Treating the different faces of overconfidence, in the same 
way, is a mistake (Moore & Schatz, 2017). The authors stressed that the different forms of 
overconfidence have distinct psychological origins. Accordingly, one form of overconfidence 
can be affected as conditions vary, while the other form remains uninfluenced. Therefore, 
finance researchers should consider the different faces of overconfidence and adapt different 
methodologies from what has been used before, through employing new measures which allow 
for clear identification of overconfidence existence (Moore & Schatz, 2017).  
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Unfortunately, the resources and time constraints of the master’s program have not allowed 
addressing these limitations, but the results found have shed light on the need to conduct further 
research.  
5.5 Contribution  
This research has investigated a gap that has not been addressed before in the Australian 
Context. The business, finance and management literature are rich with overconfidence studies 
and contributions on the individual level, while just a few addressed this behavioural bias on 
the corporate level. Most of the studies have been done in the US, while just a few have been 
done in Australia.  
The overconfidence of A-REITs’ CEOs has not been investigated before. This is quite 
surprising given the importance of the A-REIT market and the fact that overconfidence plays 
a vital role in the investment decision-making process. This study has found that the degree of 
corporate overconfidence in Australia is significantly different from what is found in other 
countries, especially the US.  
5.6 Research Implications 
This study has raised new questions that need to be addressed in the future. Previous studies 
have stressed that overconfidence has serious implications for corporate governance, and that 
strong corporate governance structure can mitigate the overinvestment problem which also 
related to overconfidence. Accordingly, the issues that should be addressed in the future are: 
• The role or impact of corporate governance on CEOs’ behaviour in Australian companies, 
especially A-REITs. 
• New measures that should be employed to account for different forms of overconfidence 




• Factors that can help mitigate overconfidence, which can result in making better 
investment decisions. 
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